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In this book, I apply a philosophical approach to study the precautionary 
principle in environmental (and health) risk decision-making. The principle 
says that unacceptable environmental and health risks should be anticipated, 
and they ought to be forestalled before the damage comes to fruition even if 
scientific understanding of the risks is inadequate. The study consists of 
introductory chapters, summary and seven original publications which aim 
at explicating the principle, critically analysing the debate on the principle, 
and constructing a basis for the well-founded use of the principle. Papers I-V 
present the main thesis of this research. In the two last papers, the discussion 
is widened to new directions. 
 
The starting question is how well the currently embraced precautionary 
principle stands up to critical philosophical scrutiny. The approach 
employed is analytical: mainly conceptual, argumentative and ethical. The 
study draws upon Anglo-American style philosophy on the one hand, and 
upon sources of law as well as concrete cases and decision-making practices 
at the European Union level and in its member countries on the other. The 
framework is environmental (and health) risk governance, including the 
related law and policy. 
 
The main thesis of this study is that the debate on the precautionary principle 
needs to be shifted from the question of whether the principle (or its weak or 
strong interpretation) is well-grounded in general to questions about the 
theoretical plausibility and ethical and socio-political justifiability of specific 
understandings of the principle. The real picture of the precautionary 
principle is more complex than that found (i.e. presumed) in much of the 
current academic, political and public debate surrounding it. While certain 
presumptions and interpretations of the principle are found to be sound, 
others are theoretically flawed or include serious practical problems. 
 
The analysis discloses conceptual and ethical presumptions and elementary 
understandings of the precautionary principle, critically assesses current 
practices invoked in the name of the precautionary principle and public 
participation, and seeks to build bridges between precaution, engagement 
and philosophical ethics. Hence, it is intended to provide a sound basis upon 
which subsequent academic scrutiny can build. 
 
 
Key words: environmental risk governance, precautionary principle, 
interpretations, public engagement, prohibitions, applied ethics 
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1.1. Description and Aim 
 
In the present thesis, I will apply a philosophical approach to study the so-
called precautionary principle1 in environmental (and health) risk decision-
making. Generally speaking, the precautionary principle says that in dubio 
pro natura. If in doubt, decide in favour of the environment. It may be 
described as a plea to foresee and forestall or to “strive for trials without an 
error” in environmental risk governance.2 More concretely, the 
precautionary principle is typically presumed to provide guidance when 
scientific knowledge about (the possible) causal relationship between 
detrimental environmental and/or health effects and an activity is 
significantly incomplete or in dispute. Lack of adequate scientific 
knowledge on the probability or magnitude of specific environmental threats 
(and health hazards) should be decided for the benefit of the environment, 
not the other way around. 
 
Presumably the most noted formulation of the principle is that adopted at the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de 
Janeiro. 
 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation (UNCED 1992, 
Principle 15). 
 
Another well-known formulation was introduced at a conference organised 
by the Science and Environment Health Network (SEHN) in 1998. 
According to it, 
 
[w]hen an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the 
environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause 
 
1 Ennaltavarautumisen periaate or varovaisuusperiaate (in Finnish), försiktighetsprincip 
(in Swedish), Vorsorgeprinzip (in German), principe de précaution (in French), principio 
de precaución (in Spanish). For a discussion on the terminology see Section 2.2. 
 
2 As a general approach (or idea), the precautionary principle is typically contrasted with 
the traditional “trial and error” risk management approach – to use Aaron Wildavsky’s 
terms – which required that the causal relationship between an action and the presumed 
damage to the environment had to be scientifically proven before taking anticipatory and 
preventive actions was justified (Wildavsky 2000; see also Section 2.3.). 
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and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically (Wingspread 
Statement on the Precautionary Principle 1998). 
 
These two formulations are commonly considered standard examples of the 
precautionary principle (II; IV; V). Nonetheless, as will come clear in what 
follows, they are insufficient to embody the subtleties of its different forms. 
 
The principal aim of this study is to assess how well the precautionary 
principle stands up to critical philosophical scrutiny. Does the principle 
present a well-founded policymaking tool in the decision-making of 
environmental threats and health hazards? In particular, the objectives of the 
study are 
 
to explicate the precautionary principle 
    1 to clarify its origin 
    2 to elucidate terminological issues 
    3 to identify the core of the principle 
    4 to identify normative choices and commitments made in the 
implementation of the principle 
    5 to distinguish the principle from other principles, approaches and 
concepts; 
 
to critically analyse the academic (and non-academic) debate on the 
precautionary principle 
    6 to identify focal problems and debated issues on the principle and 
the possible need for further scrutiny 
    7 to reconstruct and critically evaluate the main arguments presented 
for and against the principle 
    8 to expose conceptual presuppositions and flaws in the 
argumentation; 
 
to construct and propose a basis for the well-founded use of the 
precautionary principle 
    9 to introduce conceptual distinctions and frameworks in order to 
improve the conceptual foundation of the discussion and policy, 
and ethical tools to facilitate the understanding and evaluation of 
the different interpretations of the principle 
    10 to establish a set of plausible interpretations of the principle by 
narrowing down its possible readings on the basis of theoretical 
and practical grounds; 
 
to assess public engagement and the current public consultation practices 
related to risk assessment of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in 
the European Union (EU) 
11 to evaluate whether current GMO consultation practices meet the 
aims and objectives on which their introduction is typically 
justified 
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12 to discuss the ethical and socio-political foundation of public 
engagement; 
 
to discuss the role of negative norms (i.e. moral restrictions on action 
which are prohibitive in nature) in the light of traditional moral 
philosophical debates 
13 to consider the question of whether acting against moral 
prohibitions is, ethically speaking, worse than acting against some 
other moral norms in the light of three classical distinctions in 
ethics. 
 
Philosophically speaking, I try to explicate and systematically analyse the 
academic argumentation related to the precautionary principle as well as the 
actual policymaking within which it is employed. The objective is to expose 
conceptual and ethical presuppositions – which are inherent, but often not 
explicit – in the discussion and application, to offer conceptual and ethical 
tools for using the principle in (the) environmental and health risk 
governance (of GMOs), and to propose new directions for subsequent 
research.  
 
The thesis consists of three chapters – Introduction, The Precautionary 
Principle, Summary – followed by seven original papers. The introduction 
specifies the objectives, relevance, approach and framework of the study. It 
answers the questions of what is done, why, and how. Chapter 2. considers 
the origin and development of the precautionary principle, terminological 
issues, the core of the principle, and related concepts, principles and 
approaches. The summary states the main conclusions of the study. 
 
The original papers were written as independent contributions but they 
constitute a coherent whole when taken together. My views have, however, 
evolved during the years of writing these papers, and this has admittedly 
resulted in some minor tensions between them. Although there is some 
overlap and iteration in themes and discussions, each paper has its own 
original arguments. 
 
Papers I-V focus directly on the precautionary principle and present the main 
thesis of this study. In the last two papers, the discussion is widened to new, 
exploratory directions. These papers concern public engagement and GMO 
consultation practices, and the role of prohibitions in ethics. Their relevance 
for the debate on the precautionary principle may be indirect, but they offer 
valuable insights to it. 
 
“The Precautionary Principle in the Risk Management of Modern 
Biotechnology” identifies and discusses problems and debated issues related 
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to the precautionary principle. This paper forms a basis for the subsequent 
papers as the ideas discussed in it will be subjected to further scrutiny as 
well as to critical revision in the following papers. Including this first 
contribution on the precautionary principle in the study also makes 
transparent the research process and the development of my thoughts during 
the past few years. 
 
“Defending the Precautionary Principle against Three Criticisms” critically 
evaluates three criticisms which have been levelled at the precautionary 
principle in academic discourses, political arenas, and also in public 
discussions in order to reject the principle altogether. The criticisms are 
labelled as the argument from vagueness, the argument from incoherence, 
and the argument from adverse effects. 
 
“Rationale for Taking Precautions: Normative Choices and Commitments in 
the Implementation of the Precautionary Principle” introduces a framework 
which both illuminates different normative commitments and choices related 
to the implementation of the principle and enables ethical evaluation of 
specific understandings of the principle. 
 
In “The Precautionary Principle and the Risks of Modern Agri-
Biotechnology”, the precautionary principle is considered in relation to the 
current dispute over the well-founded risk governance of modern 
biotechnology. The risks of modern agri-biotechnology are briefly 
discussed, after which the principle is explicated. Two opposite views on the 
right role of the precautionary principle in agri-biotech risk governance are 
critically analysed. 
 
“On the Distinction between the Weak Interpretation and Strong 
Interpretation of the Precautionary Principle” points out problems in the 
current usage of the traditional distinction between the weak form and strong 
form of the precautionary principle upon which the ongoing debate has been 
centred. The analysis also discloses elementary understandings of the 
principle. 
 
 “A Critical Assessment of Public Consultations on GMOs in the European 
Union” highlights shortcomings in GMO consultation practices. The aims of 
public engagement and GMO consultation – in particular, serving 
democracy, informing the public, reaching consensus, enabling better 
decisions to be made, and establishing trust – are considered. 
 
“The Role of Prohibitions in Ethics” discusses the question of whether 
acting against moral prohibitions is worse than acting against other moral 
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norms in the light of three classical distinctions in ethics. The prohibition 
thesis, that is, the claim that on a moral scale prohibitions are weightier than 
other norms is related to the distinction between negative and positive rights, 




1.2. Relevance and Background 
 
Although the precautionary principle is increasingly subjected to academic 
scrutiny and remains a matter of intense debate, its ideological and ethical 
underpinnings − as well as the interrelations between precaution, public 
engagement, and basic concepts in moral philosophy − have received 
surprisingly exiguous attention. In general, ethical and other philosophical 
aspects of the precautionary principle have not been studied much. (This is 
especially the case in Finland.) The need for an ethical analysis and 
conceptual clarification has been stressed on several occasions (e.g. Foster et 
al. 2000; Manson 2002, 263; see also Carr 2002). 
 
The value of this study is two-fold. On the one hand, the present thesis may 
have theoretical significance. There are plain reasons to undertake the 
research tasks explicated above. First, the precautionary principle is 
conceptually slippery and elusive. According to David VanderZwaag (2002, 
175), “it is difficult to get a firm conceptual grip” of the principle. Hence, 
clarification of the basic concepts and distinctions related to the principle, 
such as explicating the way in which its strong interpretation differs from the 
weak one (V), is worth studying on pure theoretical grounds and valuable in 
its own right. 
 
The second source of theoretical importance springs from the fact that the 
precautionary principle is a matter of ongoing debate (see e.g. I; II; IV). 
Academic scholars (such as risk analysts, legal theorists, economists, 
decision theorists, philosophers and sociologists), decision-makers, 
representatives of environmental organisations and the lay people 
continuously argue about the principle. Despite academic efforts to clarify 
the principle and the established policy documents (such as the CEC 2000), 
the principle has remained controversial. 
 
In the discussion on the precautionary principle, disagreements and 
confusion touch upon almost all the relevant questions, even the most basic 
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theoretical ones.3 For instance, whilst most authors speak about one definite 
principle (e.g. Rogers 2001), others use the indefinite plural form (e.g. 
Löfstedt et al. 2002). Second, several phrases, such as “precaution” 
(Levidow et al. 2005) and “precautionary approach” (UNCED 1992), have 
been employed both in the academic literature and in official documents. It 
is debated whether a difference in terminology implies a difference in the 
meaning of the principle.4 Furthermore, whether it is rational to act 
according to the principle is unclear. Is the precautionary principle a 
principle of rational decision-making? Some authors are convinced that it is 
not (e.g. Morris 2000, esp. 19; Holm & Harris 1999), whereas David B. 
Resnik (2003, esp. 342), for instance, holds that at least some of the 
formulations of the principle are examples of a rational decision-making 
principle. Given these evident examples of confusion and disagreement, 
clarification and in-depth analysis of the principle are clearly needed. 
 
Third, another source of theoretical significance is that the dispute over the 
precautionary principle readdresses traditional philosophical dilemmas. 
These include ontological and epistemological questions on risk, and issues 
related to the philosophy of science and to the ethics of risk governance. 
What kind of entities are risks, and what can be known about them? Who 
should bear the burden of proof in risk policy? What is the right role of 
scientific knowledge in practical (or societal) decision-making? How should 
we respond to the known risks in an ethically sound manner? What is the 
                                                 
3 Disagreements on practical decision-making principles, such as the precautionary 
principle, can be about theoretical issues and/or issues of application. Theoretical 
questions of a decision-making principle concern, for example, the definition of the 
principle and its right status. Mutually exclusive answers to these questions present 
instances of theoretical disagreements. On the other hand, the questions of application 
concern the right interpretation and well-grounded implementation of a principle. What 
preconditions justify the application of the principle? What kind of an action (e.g. a 
precautionary measure) is justified in a particular case? Opposite answers to these 
questions are disagreements of application. 
 
(Decision-making) principles do not imply a context specific guidance, and thus their 
application to a concrete situation presupposes deliberation and interpretation (see e.g. 
Beauchamp & Childress 1994, 15; Dworkin 1976; Gardiner 2006, 58; Nollkaemper 1996, 
80-81). As a consequence, an agreement upon the theoretical questions of a principle 
does not imply an agreement upon the issues of its application. 
 
4 While the terms “principle of precautionary action” and “precautionary principle” have 
been used synonymously, it is not clear whether there is a difference in meaning between 
“precautionary principle” and “precautionary approach” (see e.g. Conco 2003, 642-643; 
Trouwborst 2002, 3-5; VanderZwaag 2002, 166-167). 
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right scope of precaution?5 The discussion on the precautionary principle 
brings philosophical questions related to risk and precaution to a new 
framework. Although there seems to be a growing interest in the field, only 
quite a limited amount of peer-reviewed philosophical studies on the 
principle is available to date.6 
 
On the other hand, the possible practical value (or social significance) of the 
study derives from the fact that the precautionary principle is used in the 
decision-making of environmental threats and health hazards. The principle 
has an influential role in societal risk governance, especially in the EU. 
Specifically, besides being an organising concept (i.e. so-called umbrella 
term) for the preservation of the environment and protection of human health 
and other sentient beings in general (see e.g. Jordan & O’Riordan 1999, 
16,18; Parker 1998, 633-634), the precautionary principle is pre-eminently a 
legal principle (or approach) that has been invoked above all in 
environmental law. It plays a role both at national and international levels. 
 
The precautionary principle is explicitly mentioned in many national 
(environmental) laws, and several governments have accepted the principle 
as a basis for policymaking.7 The GMO context provides a topical example 
of this. In Finland, the reformed Gene Technology Act (GTA 2004/847) 
mentions the principle in the first paragraph. The EU has adopted the 
principle in its modern biotechnology risk governance (see 2001/18/EC; 
CEC 2000). In international law, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CPB 2000), which regulates the 
transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms (LMOs), refers to 
the principle in its key objectives. Finally, the precautionary principle has 
been included in virtually every established international environmental 
treaty, declaration and other policy document over the past decade 
(Freestone & Hey 1996, 3; VanderZwaag 1999, 356-357). 
                                                 
5 Other questions include: How much precaution a virtuous person should take? How safe 
is safe enough? How much uncertainty are we forced/willing to accept? 
 
6 For studies on the precautionary principle which may be correctly characterised as 
philosophical see e.g. Gardiner 2006; Manson 2002; Parker 1998; Resnik 2003; Sandin et 
al. 2002; Sandin 1999; Saner 2002. See also issue 1 of Journal of Agricultural and 
Environmental Ethics 15 (2002), and issue 3 of Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 29 
(2004). 
 
7 An interesting example of the latter can be found in Austrian biotechnology policies. 
The Austrian standard of GMO risk assessment goes beyond the strict scientific 
understanding of risk, and thus it has been seen as precautionary in nature (Torgersen & 




Beyond doubt, clarification of the confusion and disagreements related to the 
principle has not only theoretical significance but definite practical value as 
well. This becomes evident when considering two further points on the 
precautionary principle. First, many definitions of the principle have been 
proposed in the academic literature, and a number of formulations of the 
principle can be found in official documents (for instance, in international 
treaties) (see e.g. Trouwborst 2002). In his article on the dimensions of the 
precautionary principle, Per Sandin (1999) identifies 19 different 
formulations of the principle. In addition to the obvious surface differences 
(see e.g. Manson 2002, 263), there are significant differences in the content 
of the formulations (see III). Consensus has not been established concerning 
the exact meaning or the right definition of the principle (e.g. Adams 2002, 
302; Lemons et al. 1997, 210; Kaiser 1997, 203).8 Second, there are no 
commonly accepted guidelines for the implementation of the principle. For 
instance, in spite of the Communication on the Precautionary Principle 
(CEC 2000), which was introduced by the Commission of the European 
Communities in order to standardise the use of the principle, the adopted 
national “precautionary policies” within the EU have varied in a wide range 
(see Levidow et al. 2005). Accordingly, there is a plain, practically 
motivated, need for theoretical studies on these issues. 
 
Because the precautionary principle is used in public policy in several 
countries, views about it and especially the mode of implementation chosen 
affect the whole society. First, implementing the principle in a regulatory 
framework redistributes risks. Second, applying the principle has influential 
effects on the rights and freedoms of individuals, companies and scientific 
community (for instance, on the limits of acceptable scientific research). 
Third, since the use of the precautionary principle also implies redistributing 
costs, the way in which the principle is applied has further social impacts. It 
is certainly worth − ethically speaking even necessary − to consider whether 
these redistributions of risks, rights, costs and benefits are just and 
democratic. 
 
That the application of the precautionary principle is fundamentally a 
normative choice should be emphasised. The degree to which we are 
prepared to take precautions is related to the value(s) which we attach to 
                                                 
8 There are several interpretations (or understandings) of the precautionary principle. The 
principle leaves much space for variability and discretion owing to its numerous different 
formulations in the official documents, and because of the general nature of the terms 
employed in them. Partially, this has led to disagreements in the application of the 
principle in concrete situations. 
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nature, society, human well-being, and social equality. In general, societal 
decision-making should be based upon the premise that actions taken are 
consistent with certain shared values of a society. Thus, in an acceptable 
application of the precautionary principle, evaluative and normative 
presuppositions are taken into account, explicated and justified. 
 
In the commentary literature, however, the normative dimensions of the 
precautionary principle have been largely neglected.9 In policymaking, the 
principle is often used to justify a wide range of policies (even mutually 
contradictory ones) (see e.g. Levidow et al. 2005); this is usually done 
without any explicitly stated normative framework. For instance, the 
Commission of the European Communities has emphasised the scientific 
aspects of precautionary decision-making and ignored almost totally the 
justification of its basic values (for a discussion see Carr 2002). Without 
clarification of the normative background of the precautionary principle, it is 
impossible to satisfactorily answer several important issues, such as the 
question of whether the implementation of the principle is compatible with 
the common values shared in a society.10 It is worth noticing that the 
popularity and highlighted nature of the precautionary principle may reflect 
a change in people’s fundamental values and world-views and/or a changed 
situation with regard to the inducement and management of environmental 
threats and health hazards. 
 
The practical value of the study is further increased by the fact that the 
relevance of the precautionary principle is not limited to a single regulatory 
context, but it plays a role in a number of them. The precautionary principle 
has been invoked in various fields of risk debates and policymaking. It is 
also mentioned in several official documents within different regulatory 
contexts. Its relevance touches upon, for instance, marine and fisheries 
protection (see e.g. VanderZwaag 2002, 171-173); the regulation of 
chemicals; climate change and global warming debate; the protection of the 
ozone layer (e.g. Montreal Protocol 1987;11 the Vienna Convention 1985);12 
nuclear power risk; risks associated with radio frequency electromagnetic 
                                                 
9 René von Schomberg (2006) discusses the normative basis of application of the 
precautionary principle in a recent article. 
 
10 In Finnish society, these are typically taken to include social equality and solidarity, for 
example. 
 
11 Preamble, Paragraphs 6 and 8. 
 
12 Preamble, Paragraph 5. 
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fields of power lines as well as with cellular telephones and cellular 
telephone base stations;13 the conservation of our natural environment;14 
biodiversity protection; the governance of modern biotechnology (see e.g. I; 
IV; Ahteensuu 2007; Myhr & Traavik 2003; CPB 2000), and the debate over 
nanotechnology (e.g. Weckert & Moor 2006). 
 
Actually, the significance of the precautionary principle goes beyond the 
above. It has been argued that the principle played a major role in a change 
of approach towards nature in (international) environmental law and policy. 
According to this standpoint, whilst the traditional (anthropocentric) 
approach to environmental issues was based upon the preservation of 
economic, health and aesthetic concerns, the modern (ecocentric/reformed 
anthropocentric) approach emphasises the vulnerability and intrinsic value 
of nature and different species, sustainable development, precaution and 
global concerns. An incontestable transition towards environment-oriented 
apprehensions and policy can be observed. In his book Precautionary Legal 
Duties and Principles of Modern International Environmental Law (1994), 
Harald Hohmann concludes that 
 
[t]his analysis validates the reference to a change of paradigm in 
international environmental law. Traditional international environmental 
law, which had been focused on efficient allocation of resources, has 
developed into its modern phase principally concerned with environmental 
protection. Since 1982-1987, modern international environmental law has 
been largely characterized by precautionary legal duties and principles. 
Our analysis has shown that the precautionary principle is now established 
in modern international environmental law. (Hohmann 1994, 344.)15 
 
                                                 
13 For discussion see e.g. Balzano & Sheppard 2002; Foster et al. 2000. 
 
14 See e.g. The Precautionary Principle Project: Sustainable Development, Natural 
Resource Management and Biodiversity Conservation (in <URL: 
http://www.pprinciple.net/ [12.7.2006]). 
 
15 It should be noted that not everybody agrees upon this stance, i.e. on the role of the 
precautionary principle in international (soft) law and on the categorisation of the 
approaches in international law. However, the Commission of the European 
Communities, for instance, affirms the former claim when it states that the precautionary 
principle has “become a full-fledged and general principle of international law” (CEC 
2000, 11; see also Hohmann 1994; Trouwborst 2002). Furthermore, even if the 
significant changes in international environmental law have been named, described, and 
classified variously, the shift towards the ideas of sustainable development, precaution 




In general, as (undesirable) consequences of new scientific and industrial 
developments have become more complex and difficult to predict, less 
limited spatially (i.e. they cross national borders) and temporally (they affect 
the future generations), and sometimes irreversible (see Beck 1992), a clear 
shift towards anticipatory and precautionary approaches in environmental 
(and health) regulation and policymaking as well as in the related non-
academic and academic debates can be noticed. Many people, especially in 
affluent Western countries, are less willing to accept a “trial and error” (risk) 
management approach, that is, to possibly seriously damage the environment 
and human and animal health by proceeding with new technologies and 
products unless they can be scientifically proven to pose a risk. 
 
In the theoretical literature, this transition towards anticipatory and 
precautionary approaches16 is encapsulated in the juxtaposition of risk and 
uncertainty (e.g. Stirling 2002, esp. 77-82), prevention and precaution 
(Sandin 2004b, 463; Trouwborst 2002, esp. 35-44), reactive and proactive 
approaches (IV), (normal) science and post-normal science (Funtowicz & 
Ravetz 1993; Ravetz 2004), simple modernity and reflexive modernity 
(Beck 1992), expert-driven decision-making and participatory practices 
(Johnson 2007; Funtowicz & Ravetz 1993; see also Weinberg 1972),17 just 
to mention but a few examples. 
 
This “anticipatory (or precautionary) turn” in environmental protection and 
institutionalised risk governance is also inextricably linked with the 
distribution of the burden of proof and the choice between minimising type-I 
errors and type-II errors in scientific studies. The requirement for the 
reversal of the burden of proof, which is typically connected with the 
precautionary principle (see e.g. O’Riordan et al. 2001; Parker 1998; I; II; 
IV), is closely related to methods of scientific inquiry, that is, to the 
statistical analyses in quantitative studies. Specifically, this concerns the 
choice between minimising false positives (type-I error) and false negatives 
(type-II error). In the context of scientific risk analysis, type-I error usually 
refers to a situation where one concludes wrongly that a technology (or 
product) is unsafe, whereas type-II error refers to a situation where one 
concludes wrongly that no severe damage will result from using a 
                                                 
16 In the academic literature, several terms and phrases have been used to refer to the 
anticipatory and precautionary approaches. Brian Wynne (1992), for example, employs 
the term “preventive paradigm”. In his view, the precautionary principle brings the 
preventive approach into effect (ibid.). 
 
17 According to Genevieve Fuji Johnson (2007, 82), “discursive democracy tends to 
imply precautionary public reasoning”. 
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technology. Minimising type-I errors reduces the chance of accepting false 
identifications of risks as the basis of decision-making. Accordingly, there is 
a greater burden of proof on the individuals and collectives who postulate 
some, rather than no, severe consequences. On the other hand, minimising 
type-II errors would reduce instances of failure to identify real risks with 
harmful consequences in environmental and health decision-making. This 
would place the burden of proof on risk imposers rather than on risk victims 
and regulators. In scientific practice, it is common to prefer minimising false 
positives (type-I error). In risk governance, it is currently disputed whether 
one should minimise either type-I errors (i.e. false assertions of harm) or 
type-II errors (false assertions of no harm). The choices are mutually 
exclusive, i.e. there is a trade-off between type-I and type-I errors. (For 
further discussion see e.g. Belt & Gremmen 2002; Shrader-Frechette 1991.) 
 
The EU’s approach to GMOs provides a topical and concrete example of the 
“strive for trials without an error” approach.18 Directive 2001/18/EC, which 
is concerned with the deliberate release and placing on the market of GMOs, 
states in its General Obligations that 
 
[m]ember States shall, in accordance with the precautionary principle, 
ensure that all appropriate measures are taken to avoid adverse effects on 
human health and the environment which might arise from the deliberate 
release or the placing on the market of GMOs (ibid., Article 4; see also 
CEC 2000). 
 
Besides explicitly mentioning the precautionary principle several times, it 
can be argued that the directive builds up a precautionary regulatory 
framework. René von Schomberg from the European Commission states that 
 
[t]his framework (…) takes a normative stand on GMOs as such, since it 
defines GMOs as a priori potentially hazardous and shifts the burden of 
proof to the proponents of the activity, e.g. the applier for a GMO has to 
demonstrate safety rather than regulatory agencies or third parties have to 
demonstrate a risk (Schomberg 2006, 13). 
 
In particular, the precautionary nature of GMO risk governance is reflected 
by the fact that in environmental risk assessment (e.r.a.), not only direct and 
                                                 
18 The EU has adopted the precautionary principle in its modern biotechnology risk 
governance (see CEC 2000). Directive 2001/18/EC mentions the principle several times. 
Moreover, the principle is incorporated into the Treaty on European Union since 1992 as 
one of the basic principles upon which all its environmental policy should be based 
(Article 130r[2] of the Treaty Establishing the European Community). The other 
principles mentioned are the principle of preventative action, the polluter pays principle, 
and the source principle. 
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immediate but also indirect and delayed effects are considered (see Directive 
2001/18/EC, Annex II[A]); by shifting the burden of proof onto potential 
risk imposers; by the commitment that environmental and human health 
issues take priority over economic benefits (or concerns); and by the 
requirement of case by case analysis. 
 
The introduction of GMOs into the environment should be carried out 
according to the ‘step by step’ principle. This means that the containment 
of GMOs is reduced and the scale of release increased gradually, step by 
step, but only if evaluation of the earlier steps in terms of protection of 
human health and the environment indicates that the next step can be 
taken. (Ibid., (24).) 
 
Small cautious steps are taken, and errors avoided. Historically, the 
precautionary principle was used as a justifying reason for the de facto EU 
Council moratorium on commercial approvals of GM crops. Between late 
1999 and 2004 no authorisations were given. 
 
In sum, given the importance of the precautionary principle in modern 
societal risk governance, the way in which the principle is viewed and 
implemented has wide social implications. At its best, theoretical research 
on the research tasks explicated above has importance for environmental law 
and policy. The final estimation of the practical significance of this study is 
left to the decision-maker’s own consideration. In every case, it is a fact that 
the governance of risks has come to the fore both in the theoretical literature 
and in public discourses, and that the precautionary principle is presumed to 
provide an answer regarding how to deal with uncertain and often complex 
environmental risks. 
 
Precaution and Public Engagement. Traditional environmental risk 
governance was based upon “sound” science and expert judgements, i.e. 
scientific risk assessment and management. Modern (precautionary) 
environmental risk governance, in its turn, also relies upon science but 
acknowledges its limits (see Weinberg 1972; Funtowicz & Ravetz 1993) and 
also takes into account the views of the public. Paper VI evaluates the 
objectives of public engagement in general and of GMO consultation in 
particular. Besides few exceptions (e.g. Johnson 2007; Klinke & Renn 2002; 
Stirling 2001), the issues of precaution and public engagement have not been 
considered together in the relevant theoretical literature. Nevertheless, the 
current practices of GMO consultation in the EU may be interpreted as an 
implementation of the precautionary principle. Reasons for this are as 
follows: As argued in Papers I-V, precautionary measures can take the form 
of outright bans and phase-outs, moratoria, pre-market testing, labelling and 
requests for extra scientific information before proceeding. However, 
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another kind of a precautionary response is the establishment and 
implementation of new precautionary risk assessment methodologies. The 
focus then is not only on how to deal with established threats, but also on 
methods to anticipate and assess threats in the first place (see Klinke et al. 
2006; Tickner 2003). Although the first-mentioned question might also 
provide an interesting – but to date somewhat neglected – ground to connect 
“precautionary governance” and public engagement, GMO consultation 
makes it in the latter sense. Citizens’ views and input are taken into 
consideration at the level of scientific risk assessment, not that of risk 
management. Specifically, only comments that provide new information 
related to scientific risk assessment are taken into account (VI). As a 
consequence, risk assessment, ideally speaking, becomes “extended” and a 
product of expert and public dialogue, and can thus be considered 
precautionary in nature. Although there have obviously been many reasons 
for establishing GMO consultation (ibid.), the practice might be interpreted 
to presume that science (esp. experts) alone is considered insufficient even 
in the framing and assessment of environmental threats and health hazards. 
As becomes clear in Chapter 2. (I; II; IV; see also Starr 2003), the 
precautionary principle is commonly taken to challenge the prevailing 
quantitative risk assessment methodology. Moreover, Directive 2001/18/EC, 
upon which GMO consultation practice is legally based, has been described 
as a precautionary regulatory framework (see e.g. Schomberg 2006, esp. 13). 
 
Precaution, Prohibitions, and Moral Philosophy. Taking precautions is a 
choice, and a deliberate choice per se implies values, norms, or preferences 
(even if the agent her/himself is unaware of them). Paper VII discusses 
moral norms and restrictions on action in general. Including the paper in this 
study presents an attempt to address the relation between the debate on the 
precautionary principle and the wider context of moral philosophical 
tradition. My claim is that the precautionary principle has been connected to 
ethics (i.e. to moral philosophy) in an insufficient fashion.19 In fact, the lack 
of this kind of analyses poses a problem because the discussion becomes 
easily philosophically shallow. Hence, this paper might provide exploratory 
input and new ideas for subsequent research on precaution. Although the 
principle is not assessed or explicitly referred to, several interesting 
connections between taking precautions and imposing moral prohibitions 
exist. A direct connection between the issues – and the most significant 
implication – is that if prohibitions were weightier than other norms on a 
moral scale, then precautionary measures that are prohibitive in nature 
                                                 
19 I am only aware of Marc Saner’s (2002) paper which tries to connect the precautionary 
principle with three traditional theories of normative ethics. 
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(phase-outs, moratoria, etc.) would be morally weightier. Second, if it is 
morally worse to do wrong by committing a positive act than by committing 
a negative act (i.e. an omission), then anthropocentric threats should be 
given priority when taking precautions (III). Moreover, it would also follow 
that imposing new environmental threats and health hazards by introducing 
new (bio)technologies is ethically worse than are the risks related to the 
postponement of the introduction of these technologies (II; IV). In general, 
several environmental policies seem to rest upon an implicit distinction 
between acting and omitting (i.e. doing and allowing), and to date this is not 
sufficiently addressed in the discussion on the precautionary principle.20 
Third, in certain formulations and interpretations, the precautionary principle 
is considered to imply a duty for anticipatory actions. In others, taking 
precautionary measures is optional.21 (III.) However, the debate on the 
principle has only rarely been connected to the moral philosophical 
discussions on duties, morally indifferent actions and supererogatory 





The present thesis is about applying theoretical analysis to an issue that is − 
at least in the end − practical and concrete in nature. The approach 
employed, and which I try to elaborate, is analytical: mainly conceptual, 
argumentative and ethical. The principal methodological presumption is that 
certain methods of philosophical enquiry are suitable for the analysis of the 
precautionary principle, and for the explication and evaluation of the dispute 
over it. The study draws upon the Western tradition of philosophy – 
specifically that of Anglo-American style – and philosophical bioethics on 
the one hand, and upon sources of law, decision-making practices (e.g. 
                                                 
20 Marion Hourdequin (2006) has considered the relation between doing, allowing, and 
precaution. 
 
21 As explicated by Sandin (1999, 895), formulations of the precautionary principle often 
differ with regard to the normative status of the precautionary response. As an example of 
this, the application of precautionary measures may be stated as justified or obligatory 
(see also Cameron & Wide-Gery 1995, 100,135). 
 
22 Lastly, moral critics have invoked the precautionary principle in general in trying to 
make our ordinary morality more demanding. However, as is seen in Papers I-V, the 
principle includes a great variety of different forms/interpretations, and thus invoking and 
acting in accordance with it does not necessarily imply changes in our moral views (i.e. 
in common/prevailing morality). 
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national consultations of the public) and concrete cases at the EU level and 
in its member countries on the other.23 
 
What is, then, meant by the philosophical approach? In other words, how is 
the study conducted in practice? Three main approaches can be 
distinguished: conceptual clarification, argumentation analysis, and ethical 
analysis. 
 
Conceptual clarification refers to the clarification of the meaning and history 
of concepts. This means (1) an attempt to reveal conceptual presuppositions, 
implications and imprecision of certain uses of a concept, and (2) an 
evaluation of the distinctions made and established conceptual frameworks 
within which the concepts are employed. In this study, the conceptual 
clarification takes a broad form. The precautionary principle is explicated by 
clarifying its core propositions; by identifying its paradigm examples; and 
by abstracting its basic structure (III; IV). Moreover, the principle is 
distinguished from other principles, approaches and concepts which have 
typically been taken to be synonymous or otherwise related to it (e.g. in the 
sense of being subordinate to the principle). In addition to this somewhat 
ahistorical viewpoint, the origin of the principle is considered (IV; Section 
2.1.).24 
 
The fact that the discussion on the precautionary principle contains 
conceptual ambiguities and imprecision, and that there are several 
interpretations of the principle and its key concepts (see e.g. Manson 2002; 
Sandin 1999) demonstrates a need for conceptual clarification. There are 
conceptual issues to be solved. As an example, the distinction between weak 
interpretation and strong interpretation of the principle has been employed in 
various meanings without proper explication (V). In the academic literature, 
the need for a systematic analysis of the key concepts has been stressed on 
several occasions (e.g. Foster et al. 2000; Manson 2002, 263). 
 
                                                 
23 The research material employed is not restricted to academic philosophical and 
bioethical argumentation. Besides the academic commentary literature, documentation 
such as research institute reports, national legislation and international treaties, other 
official documents (e.g. policy recommendations, declarations) and judicial decisions 
have been used. 
 
24 Given the variety of the ways of explication employed, historical view and the lack of 
purely hypothetical thought experiments, the traditional conceptual analysis which aims 
at establishing a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of a concept (see 
e.g. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: concepts) should not be straightforwardly 
identified with the conceptual clarification employed in this study. 
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Besides being about concepts, philosophy is argumentative and dialectical in 
its very nature. The argumentation analysis involves reconstructing 
arguments from a chosen context of argumentation. Conclusion(s), premises, 
relations between the identified premises, relevant background 
presuppositions, and the strength of the inference from premises to 
conclusion(s) are explicated and systematically evaluated. By reconstructing 
arguments, it is possible to abstract various theoretical positions which need 
to be evaluated independently. As a result of argumentation analysis, 
fallacies and other inconsistencies in argumentation can be detected, sound 
and unsound arguments can be separated, and it is possible to point out 
premises that spring from deep value commitments. The need for 
argumentation analysis results from the fact that although certain particular 
formulations of the precautionary principle have been subjected to a critical 
evaluation (e.g. Turner & Hartzell 2004), there are only a few analyses of 
the arguments presented for and against the precautionary principle.25 
Argumentation analysis is employed in Papers II and IV. 
 
Ethical analysis, roughly speaking, consists of explication and evaluation of 
value basis and normative background assumptions in given arguments and 
theoretical positions, and also of providing explicit ethical theories. The 
question of whether or not the precautionary principle presents a well-
founded policymaking tool in societal risk governance is fundamentally an 
ethical and socio-political one; thus, it cannot be answered by science 
alone.26 Although scientific findings play a necessary role in the decision-
making of societal matters, they cannot alone provide the justification for a 
certain mode of action. Decision-making is about making choices, and a 
deliberative choice implies values or norms which cannot be exclusively 
derived from scientific knowledge (I; Hume 2000). Accordingly, there is a 
definite need for ethical analysis (see also Carr 2002, 31). Especially Paper 
III employs this approach. 
 
There are at least two further reasons for applying the philosophical 
approach to study the precautionary principle. First, philosophy may be 
                                                 
25 The only ones which I am aware of are that of Per Sandin and his colleagues (see 
Sandin et al. 2002) and that of Stephen M. Gardiner (2006). 
 
26 The issues related to the precautionary principle touch upon several academic 
disciplines, however. The principle can be seen as a junction of technological know-how 
(what can be done?), policymaking (what has been done?), science (what can be known 
about the effects of an action?) and ethics (what should be done?). Consequently, a 
complete − and even a satisfactory − analysis of the precautionary principle is necessarily 
interdisciplinary in nature, and (moral) philosophical analysis forms an indistinguishable 
part of it. 
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suitable for providing a uniting – and perhaps to some extent impartial – 
overview of the ongoing discussions in different contexts (e.g. in risk 
analysis literature, in legal and social sciences literature, and in public 
discussions). Second, given the nature of certain somewhat theoretical 
problems in the current debate on the principle (V), these issues might be 
best solved by philosophical analysis. 
 
During the study, I try to embrace two methodological virtues, namely those 
of simplicity and concreteness. The aim is not to make complex issues even 
more complicated, but to illuminate the issues under study, and to make 
these matters attainable also for non-specialists. Besides purely 
philosophical ambitions, I hope to further discussion within environmental 
and health risk policymaking. The thesis is, thus, intended for an 
interdisciplinary audience. Second, by binding the study to actual practices 
(e.g. to de facto decision-making procedures) and by providing concrete case 
examples (law texts and official policy decisions), I attempt to take into 
consideration the relevance of context in these matters, and to conduct an 
analysis with clear practical implications. In sum, the approach chosen as 
well as the research material employed were versatile in nature, reflecting 






The overall framework of this study is environmental (and health) risk 
governance, with a special consideration for the EU level decision-making 
practices (IV; VI).27 Although environmental risk governance includes a 
variety of methods developed to identify, assess and evaluate environmental 
threats and health hazards, and to cope with the risks,28 it is usually 
considered to consist of scientific risk analysis which includes risk 
assessment, risk management and risk communication, and of the related 
legislation and policymaking. 
 
                                                 
27 The study is about well-founded governance of complex and uncertain environmental 
risks (e.g. loss of biodiversity) and health risks (e.g. increased allergies). Other kinds of 
risks are considered only indirectly. For instance, economic risks are taken into account 
while assessing the right role of the cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in precautionary 
decision-making (II; IV). 
 
28 As an example, environmental impact assessment, technological assessment, and 
epidemiology. 
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Risk assessment, as commonly characterised, is a process based upon 
science in which knowledge about hazards is produced. It consists of 
different phases which follow each other. Environmental and health risk 
assessment includes (1) identification of biological, chemical and physical 
agents that may cause adverse effects to human and animal health, and to the 
environment; (2) characterisation of the adverse effects which are associated 
with the identified agents; (3) determination of the relationship between 
exposure to the identified agents and the severity and/or frequency of the 
associated adverse effects, and evaluation of the likely intake of the agents; 
and (4) estimation of the probability of occurrence and severity of the 
adverse effects, and evaluation of uncertainties which are identified during 
the assessment process. (See e.g. NRC 1983.) 
 
Risk management, in turn, consists of decision-making and action in which 
the characterised risks are governed. More precisely, it is a process of 
evaluating and selecting between policy alternatives (i.e. regulatory actions 
and inaction) in the light of the results of risk assessment, and implementing 
the chosen regulatory actions. In addition to the risk assessment results, risk 
management includes consideration of social factors (such as political, 
technical and economic factors, and the attitudes of the general public). 
 
Risk communication may be briefly described as the interactive exchange of 
information and opinions throughout the risk analysis process among risk 
assessors, risk managers, stakeholders and the lay people. Two-way 
communication between experts and the general public is usually presumed. 
From the side of specialists, it should include a non-technical explanation of 
risk assessment findings and the basis of risk management decisions. 
 
The precautionary principle has typically been thought to present a risk 
management principle or tool (e.g. CEC 2000, 3,13). The following 
statements, for instance, reflect this fact: “[p]recautionary principles have 
been proposed as a fundamental element of sound risk management” 
(Löfstedt et al. 2002, 381) and the principle “is invoked in the process of risk 
management” (Rogers 2001, 1). In practice, this means that the 
precautionary principle can be applied when a risk has been identified in the 
preceding risk assessment but a considerable amount of uncertainty remains 
(i.e. the probability of the risk cannot be quantified or the magnitude of the 
risk is unknown).  
 
Nevertheless, there have been other standpoints as well (IV; V). Many 
authors have argued that the precautionary principle should already be taken 
into consideration at the level of risk assessment. According to this position, 
the principle works not only as a risk management principle/tool, but it also 
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affects the way in which risk assessment is conducted (Goldstein & Carruth 
2004, 491-493; see also Levidow et al. 2005, 268-269). Notions such as 
“precautionary appraisal” (Klinke et al. 2003) and “precautionary 
assessment” (Tickner 2000, Chapter 7.) reflect this kind of claim. The 
dissension can be stated as follows: 
 
(1) The precautionary principle is a risk management principle/tool. An 
application of the principle is always a risk management decision that 
should be kept separate from the process of risk assessment. 
 
(2) The PP should already be taken into consideration at the level of risk 
assessment, not only in the process of risk management. The use of the 
principle in a regulatory framework changes the way in which risk 
assessment is conducted. 
 
The identified theoretical positions (1&2) seem to reflect a genuine 
disagreement. The positions are mutually exclusive, that is, a consistent 
person cannot believe in both of them at the same time. This derives from 
the fact that a third proposition, i.e. risk assessment and risk management 
should be separated, is presumed by the two positions. In practice, risk 
assessment and risk management have traditionally been strictly separated. 
While the former is based on scientific methods and some have even thought 
it to be value-neutral, the latter is a decision-making process which is in the 
end necessarily a political one (e.g. Farrow 2004, 727). For instance, 
Recommendation 1 of the so-called Red Book of risk assessment says that  
 
[r]egulatory agencies should take steps to establish and maintain a clear 
conceptual distinction between assessment of risks and the consideration 
of risk management alternatives; that is, the scientific findings and policy 
judgements embodied in risk assessment should be explicitly distinguished 
from the political, economic, and technical considerations which influence 
the design and choice of regulatory strategies (NRC 1983, 151). 
 
The normative position that risk assessment and risk management should be 
separated cannot be easily threatened by the accumulation of new 
knowledge (i.e. by scientific developments), because it derives from 
fundamental commitments (moral standpoints, epistemological positions and 
world-views) which exceed the scope of science. Even if risk assessment, in 
practice, includes decisions that cannot be derived from scientific methods 
and even if science per se is not a value-free enterprise (see e.g. Rudner 
1953; Longino 1983), the normative view that the processes of risk 
assessment and risk management should be distinguished (as far as it is 
possible) may still be convincing. 
 
 20 
In order to empirically undermine the claim that the theoretical positions 
identified (1&2) reflect a genuine disagreement, one would have to 
demonstrate that risk assessment and risk management are necessarily 
intertwined, and that any application of the precautionary principle belongs 
to the blurred area where the distinction cannot be made. The burden of 
proof seems to lie with the proponents of this empirical claim. In the 
meantime, the methods of applied ethics and epistemology can be used to 
assess the credibility of the two positions. Yet the disagreement may be hard 
to solve if neither of the theoretical positions explicated can be shown as 
inherently incoherent or otherwise unconvincing. 
 
In this study, I do not see any prima facie type reason to restrict the role of 
the precautionary principle to the risk management phase. Such a limitation 
may, however, be justified in a specific regulatory context. 
 
The main focus of the study is on societal risks. Societal risks such as the 
possible negative consequences of the global climate change29 may be 
contrasted with individual risks. Roughly, the latter are chosen, i.e. they 
arise from an individual’s choices (such as the possible negative 
consequences of active smoking), whereas in the first case an individual’s 
possibilities to affect his/her risk exposure are more limited (see e.g. 
Shrader-Frechette 1985, 19-20). It should be noted that the distinction is a 
matter of degree, not of a qualitative difference. As an example, an 
individual has some power over her/his modern agri-biotechnology risk 
exposure, for instance, owing to labelling requirements. Governmental 
authorities typically regulate the production of societal risks. Societal risk 
decision-making is presumed to be transparent, proportional and non-
discriminatory, and based on (commonly accepted) due reasons. Whilst the 
present thesis concerns primarily the governance of societal risks, many of 
the conclusions reached seem to be valid for the assessment of individual 
risk-taking (under serious and uncertain risks) as well.30 
 
In the study, the precautionary principle is considered a principle of practical 
decision-making which may be justified on the basis of ethical and socio-
political grounds and/or as a form of rational action. This presumption 
                                                 
29 For example, in the form of increased hurricanes (or typhoons) (see e.g. Webster et al. 
2005). 
 
30 Individual and societal risk decision-making differ in relevant respects, however. 
Decision-making concerning societal risks ought to be well-grounded. There is a moral 
obligation to give commonly accepted reasons for decisions which concern groups of 
people; the decisions taken should not be arbitrary. 
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leaves much space for different interpretations of the right status of the 
principle, and it is undertaken in order to complete an analysis that is as 
general as possible. In the relevant academic literature, the precautionary 
principle has been regarded as a decision rule (Hansson 1997), epistemic 
(i.e. belief-guiding) principle (Peterson 2007), a risk management tool (CEC 
2000, 3,13), a legal principle (Trouwborst 2002), an ethical principle (Carr 
2002, 31; see also Parker 1998, 638), a methodological rule for risk research 
(see Ahteensuu 2006, 554-555), and an organising concept for various 
contemporary ideas that challenge the regulatory status quo (Jordan & 
O’Riordan 1999). 
 
It is obvious that from the metaethical point of view, the precautionary 
principle cannot be considered the ultimate moral norm from which all 
theories, other principles and judgements can be deduced. The situations in 
which the principle is relevant are limited to certain risk decision-making 
problems, i.e. to complex environmental and health risks which are serious 
and of which we lack adequate scientific understanding. For example, the 
principle cannot be invoked when the effects of different possible actions are 
known or when (objective) probabilities can be assigned to them. Hence, it 
is necessary to view the precautionary principle in the context of other same 
level principles, more general (higher level) theories,31 and more specific 
(lower level) rules and particular judgements.32 Similarly, in the context of 
decision theory, the precautionary principle cannot be regarded as the sole 
principle of rational action because of the limited set of decision-making 
situations in which it can be applied. 
 
Complete with these objectives, approach and framework, let us now begin 








                                                 
31 As will become clear later on, several different theories and approaches may provide 
justification or even imply the implementation of the precautionary principle. It has been 
argued, for instance, that a general approach based upon sustainable development 
requires the implementation of the precautionary principle as part of it (see Section 2.4.) 
 
32 Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress (1994), for example, have suggested this 
kind of role for ethical principles. 
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2. THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
 
 
The precautionary principle lacks clarity and is a matter of confusion. 
Despite the clear common sense appeal of the general idea of precaution, the 
precautionary principle seems to resist an exact definition (see e.g. 
VanderZwaag 2002). According to Andrew Jordan and Timothy O’Riordan, 
 
[the precautionary principle] is neither a well-defined nor a stable concept. 
(…) Admittedly, precaution lacks a specific definition. As yet, it cannot 
prescribe specific actions or solve the kind of moral, ethical and economic 
dilemmas that are part and parcel of the modern environmental condition. 
(…) To date, precaution provides few, if any, operable guidelines for 
policy makers nor does it constitute a rigorous analytical schema. (Jordan 
& O’Riordan 1999, 16.) 
 
This selective quotation may not do justice to Jordan and O’Riordan’s 
general argument. Instead of taking the elusiveness of the precautionary 
principle as a weakness, they consider it − rather unintuitively − as a 
strength (II). However, the quotation highlights a commonly agreed fact 
about the precautionary principle: the principle and its application are 
shrouded in mystery. Even a short review of the relevant academic literature 
reveals the absence of consensus in regard to several issues of the principle. 
There is neither a commonly accepted definition of the precautionary 
principle nor an agreement upon the interpretation of its key concepts. 
Shared and consistently followed guidelines for its implementation are also 
lacking. In fact, these two facts are explicitly mentioned in a number of the 
academic articles on the principle (see e.g. Adams 2002, 302; Kaiser 1997, 
203; Lemons et al. 1997, 210; Manson 2002; Sandin 1999; VanderZwaag 
2002). 
 
The precautionary principle is a matter of ongoing disagreements. These 
dissensions are not restricted to its exact definition and well-founded 
implementation, but they touch upon almost all the relevant questions of the 
principle, e.g. the origin of the principle, its first appearance in official 
documents, and terminological issues (Section 1.2.). I do not claim that there 
have not been any serious attempts to clarify and define the precautionary 
principle in the relevant academic literature and elsewhere. For certain there 
are such studies (CEC 2000; Gardiner 2006; Manson 2002; Sandin 1999). 
Nor is my intention to argue that no progress has been made in the 
discussion. Nevertheless, it seems evident that the precautionary principle 
has remained intangible (i.e. elusive) and contentious. Although the attempts 
to clarify the principle are laudable in their own right, they are partial at best 
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because of concentrating merely on one aspect of the precautionary 
principle, e.g. on the abstraction of its formal structure. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to explicate the precautionary principle by means 
of conceptual clarification. More precisely, I try (1) to clarify the origin of 
the principle, (2) to elucidate terminological issues, (3) to identify the core 
of the principle by explicating the substantial propositions it implies, by 
identifying its paradigm examples, and by abstracting its basic structure, and 






Various views have been proposed concerning the origin of the 
precautionary principle. Furthermore, there is a disagreement over the first 
appearance of the principle in official documents (see e.g. Adams 2002). My 
objective here is to illuminate the issue of origin and development. 
Specifically, I try to show that attempts to trace back the origin of the 
precautionary principle can be subsumed under three classes. These include 
(1) the general idea of precaution, (2) specific (non-judicial) codes of 
conduct and arguments from precaution, and (3) official documents. The 
main purpose is explicatory, although the relevance of the identified sources 
is briefly evaluated. 
 
General Idea of Precaution. It has been argued that the origin of the 
precautionary principle can be found in the general and everyday idea of 
precaution. According to it, “precautions should be taken”. Philippe H. 
Martin, for instance, claims that  
 
[t]he precautionary principle is an age-old concept. Unambiguous 
reference to precaution as a management guideline is found in the 
millennial oral tradition of Indigenous People of Eurasia, Africa, the 
Americas, Oceania, and Australia. (Martin 1997, 276.) 
 
This view reflects a wide understanding of the precautionary principle, not 
restricted to environmental and health concerns. Precaution has played a role 
in oral traditions around the globe, and it guides us not to inflict harm with 
our actions. Furthermore, the core of the precautionary principle is seen as a 




No doubt, taking precautions seems to be instinctive for human beings, and 
it is certainly in accordance with common sense. “The idea that care and 
foresight are required in the face of (…) uncertain future is universal and of 
all times” (Trouwborst 2002, 7). The essence of precaution is captured by 
several English sayings such as “better safe than sorry”, “look before you 
leap”, “a stitch in time saves nine” and “an ounce of prevention is worth a 
pound of cure”.33 In fact, the close relation between these sayings and the 
precautionary principle is mentioned in several relevant academic articles 
(e.g. Resnik 2003, 329; Sandin 2004, 462; Trouwborst 2002, 8; 
VanderZwaag 2002, 166). 
 
Despite the apparent similarities, it should be noted, however, that these 
sayings and aphorisms are general in nature; thus, they do not provide 
specific guidance for concrete situations.34 Moreover, although these sayings 
emphasise the avoidance of harm and preparing for the uncertain future, they 
seem to do it in a wider sense than does the precautionary principle. As an 
example, unlike the general idea of precaution, the precautionary principle is 
triggered only by inadequate and/or disputed scientific knowledge 
concerning certain types of environmental threats and health hazards. 
 
Furthermore, even if we sidestep the obvious differences in content between 
precaution and the precautionary principle, we might still end up with 
another more theoretical problem. Following Sandin, 
 
[f]or a principle to be present, we might demand that the agent as a 
minimum subscribes to a claim like ‘precaution should be taken in 
situations of type T’. That the agent believes that precaution should be 
taken in the particular situation S is not sufficient. In addition, there must 
be a claim like ‘precaution should be taken in situation S and in relevantly 
similar situations’, with the relation of ‘relevantly similar’ somehow 
specified. (Sandin 2004a, 4.) 
 
                                                 
33 Interestingly, there are other sayings that seem to urge against being cautious, or that 
require action instead of inaction. These include, for instance, “nothing ventured, nothing 
gained”, “(s)he who dares wins”, “(s)he who hesitates is lost”, “fortune favours the 
brave”, “you cannot make an omelette without breaking eggs”. (In Finnish, there are also 
similar sayings, e.g. “Rohkea rokan syö” and “menköön syteen tai saveen”.) 
 
34 Some authors have argued that the precautionary principle cannot provide specific 
guidance for action in concrete cases either (see e.g. Bodansky 1991, 5; for a further 
discussion see II). 
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This minimum condition is not fulfilled in the case of sayings or the other 
writings mentioned above because the similar cases in which precaution 
should be applied are not specified. 
 
Instead of regarding precaution to be equivalent to the precautionary 
principle, it can still be considered an origin (or as a predecessor) of the 
precautionary principle. Moreover, the general idea of precaution might be 
used to explain the remarkable attention that the precautionary principle has 
received. According to VanderZwaag (2002, 166), “[a] prime reason for the 
international popularity of precaution is its reflection of common sense 
notions evident in numerous cultures”. The principle provides a practical 
implementation to several wisdoms or sayings. Arie Trouwborst argues, 
similarly, that  
 
[t]he appearance of the precautionary principle in environmental policy 
and law can thus be viewed as no more (or less) than the application to a 
specific problem area of a notion taken from everyday life (Trouwborst 
2002, 8). 
 
VanderZwaag and Trouwborst are certainly right in that a part of the evident 
“magnetism” of the precautionary principle springs from the intuitiveness of 
the general idea of precaution. It should be borne in mind, however, that 
several other factors may have had a greater influence in explaining why the 
precautionary principle has come to the fore in environmental policy 
debates. First, stakes have become higher than before. Human action can 
lead, and it has already at least contributed, to serious and irreversible 
environmental damage (see EEA 2001). Second, there is growing 
recognition of the sensitivity and intra-/inter-dependencies of ecosystems. 
Third, our limited understanding of several natural processes and the related 
risks has increasingly been admitted and emphasised (II; see also Weinberg 
1972).35 
 
In sum, although various forms of precaution have certainly been taken as 
long as human beings have existed, it would be problematic to argue that the 
precautionary principle has actually been invoked in the above-mentioned 
cases. Nevertheless, the general idea of precaution seems to have played a 
role in the formation of the precautionary principle, and it can be employed 
to partly explain the wide endorsement of the principle. 
 
                                                 
35 Tim O’Riordan, James Cameron and Andrew Jordan (2001) list reasons for the 
introduction of the precautionary principle to environmental risk management in their 
article entitled “The Evolution of the Precautionary Principle”. 
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Specific Codes of Conduct and Arguments from Precaution. The origin of 
the precautionary principle has sometimes been traced to specific (non-
judicial) codes of conduct and arguments from precaution. According to the 
former view, the basic idea of the precautionary principle has been present in 
ethical codes and policies, for instance, in public health policy. Some 
scholars have even argued that the first reference to the precautionary 
principle can be found in the Hippocratic Oath primum non nocere (first, do 
no harm) (Ozonoff 1999, 100). John D. Graham and Susan Hsia state that  
 
[i]nstitutionalized precaution can be found in the early days of medicine, 
in the form of one of the more well-known phrases of the Hippocratic 
Oath (Graham & Hsia 2002, 374). 
 
I agree that certain traditional ethical codes and policies might be correctly 
attributed as being precautionary in nature. However, in the end, these codes 
and policies seem to resemble more closely the general idea of precaution 
than the precautionary principle itself (as the latter is usually understood).36 
 
The second strategy is to trace the history of the precautionary principle to 
certain arguments from precaution which have been presented in various 
contexts, e.g. in energy policy criticism. This is the case when Julian Morris 
asserts that 
 
PP-like arguments have been used in the USA since the 1950s; at that 
time, groups of political conservatives opposed fluoridation of water on 
the grounds that fluoride was used as rat poison and that involuntary 
fluoridation amounted to mass medication, a step on the road to socialism. 
In the 1960s, left-wing radicals similarly used PP-like arguments against 
nuclear power. (…) By highlighting th[e] possibility of catastrophe, 
regardless of the probability of its occurrence, campaigners were able to 
instill fear of the technology as such. (Morris 2000, 2.)37 
  
In the 1970s, these arguments were picked up by social scientists (…), 
who presented them in a more general framework (ibid.). 
 
Morris himself does not explicate the phrase “PP-like arguments”. This 
leaves the reader with a spectrum of possible interpretations. On the one 
hand, Morris may mean that the content of the precautionary principle is 
                                                 
36 The relevance of the precautionary principle in the philosophy of medicine and 
bioethics is analysed in issue 3 of Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 29 (2004). 
 
37 Morris refers here to an earlier study on the issue made by Allan Mazur. It is worth 
mentioning that the term “precautionary principle” or the phrase “PP-like arguments” 
cannot be found in Mazur’s (1996) article. 
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present in these contexts of policy-criticism and other argumentation. On the 
other hand, he might just intend to say that the precautionary principle and 
PP-like arguments have a shared denominator in a weaker sense, e.g. in the 
form of a general risk-avoidance approach. 
 
This logical space can be narrowed down by taking a closer look at the cited 
paragraphs. From social scientists (whose argumentation relates most closely 
to the precautionary principle), Morris explicitly names David W. Pearce 
and Robert E. Goodin. They contend that when a technology poses the 
possibility of a catastrophic and/or irreversible risk, we should not proceed 
with that technology. According to Pearce, we should not introduce new 
technologies “without first having solved the problems they create” (Pearce 
1980, 58). For example, we should refrain from using nuclear power as long 
as the waste disposal problems remain unsolved. Goodin (1980), in his turn, 
invokes the possibility of a catastrophe as a reason against the use of nuclear 
power. 
 
[L]essons may be far too costly. Some nuclear mishaps will no doubt be 
modest. But for the same reasons small accidents are possible, so too are 
large ones and some of the errors resulting in failure of nuclear reactor 
safeguards may be very costly indeed. This makes trial and error 
inappropriate in that setting. (Goodin 1980, 418-419.) 
 
The mere possibility of a catastrophe is used to justify restrictions. A similar 
means of justification can be found in certain understandings of the 
precautionary principle (for discussion see Manson 2002, 270-274; Räikkä 
2004). Accordingly, because Goodin’s argument resembles some 
formulations of the precautionary principle, there might be a weak sense in 
which it can be said that the principle is actually invoked here. At least, 
Sandin’s minimum condition is fulfilled in the argumentation of Goodin and 
Pearce. Similar cases are defined, for example, by the common emphasis on 
the irreversibility of effects as a trigger condition (i.e. criterion) for taking 
precautions. Second, arguments admittedly emphasise a proactive and pre-
emptive approach (in the form of inactions) which also characterises the 
precautionary principle. 
 
This strategy is also put forward by Derek Turner and Lauren Hartzell. They 
(2004, 452) contend that German philosopher Hans Jonas “gave an early 
version of the precautionary principle” in his book The Imperative of 
Responsibility. 
 
But just this uncertainty, which threatens to make the ethical insight 
ineffectual for the long-range responsibility toward the future – an 
uncertainty not confined, of course, to the prophecy of doom – has itself to 
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be included in the ethical theory and become the cause of a new principle, 
which on its part can yield a not uncertain rule for decision-making. It is 
the rule, stated primitively, that the prophecy of doom is to be given 
greater heed than the prophecy of bliss. (Jonas 1984, 31.) 
 
Although Jonas’ vision is general in nature, it has clear similarity to the very 
basic idea of the precautionary principle. First, the principle implies that 
when considering the introduction of an activity, certain environmental and 
health risks outweigh the possible (economical) benefits of that activity. 
Second, Jonas is concerned about the possible irrevocable consequences of 
technological developments, and this also reflects the common 
understanding of the precautionary principle. 
 
In addition to the cited examples, there have been several other claims about 
the origin of the precautionary principle which can be subsumed under this 
class (see e.g. EEA 2001; Martin 1997, 264). Given the apparent similarities 
and lines of development of ideas, these arguments from precaution deserve 
to be notified when the history of the precautionary principle is under study. 
 
Judicial Documents. The most common strategy to search for the origin of 
the precautionary principle is to look for instances of it in law texts and other 
official documents. This may take two forms. The first strategy is to identify 
early explicit mentions of the precautionary principle or other equivalent 
terms. The polemic with this strategy arises from the fact that the first 
references to the principle were often short and the principle was not 
defined. Moreover, several phrases have been employed, such as the term 
“precautionary measures”38 and “precautionary approach”39 (see e.g. Adams 
2002, 304-305). 
 
A commonly agreed predecessor of the precautionary principle can be found 
in Vorsorgeprinzip (literally, foresight-planning) which was introduced to 
German environmental policy and law in 1970s.40 The Vorsorgeprinzip 
emphasises identification of early warnings of environmental threats and 
preparing beforehand for the uncertain future and for its risks. It was first 
incorporated into air and water protection law in West Germany, but it soon 
                                                 
38 E.g. Montreal Protocol 1987, Preamble, Paragraphs 6 and 8. 
 
39 Second International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea 1987, Preamble, 
Paragraph 7. 
 
40 For a discussion see e.g. Boehmer-Christiansen 1994. The other four basic principles in 
German environmental policy were Verursacherprinzip, Kooperation, Wirtschaftliche 
Prinzip and Gemeinlast Prinzip. 
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became a fundamental principle of German environmental law. According to 
the Bundesministerium des Innern (BMI 1984, 53), 
 
[t]he principle of precaution commands that the damages done to the 
natural world (which surrounds us all) should be avoided in advance and 
in accordance with opportunity and possibility. Vorsorge further means 
the early detection of dangers to health and environment by 
comprehensive, synchronized (harmonized) research, in particular about 
cause and effect relationships (…), it also means acting when conclusively 
ascertained understanding by science is not yet available. Precaution 
means to develop, in all sectors of the economy, technological processes 
that significantly reduce environmental burdens, especially those brought 
about by the introduction of harmful substances. (Cameron & Abouchar’s 
[1996, 38] translation is followed.) 
 
Despite the obvious similarity between the Vorsorgeprinzip and the 
precautionary principle, some authors have considered the former as a more 
value-laden concept than the latter (e.g. Myers 2002, 215-216). However, it 
should be borne in mind that both principles are value-laden and that the 
precautionary principle takes a wide range of forms in its implementation 
(Section 2.3.; I-V). The currently used German translation of the 
precautionary principle is the Vorsorgeprinzip. 
 
The first explicit mention of the precautionary principle (or more precisely, a 
precautionary approach) in an international environmental treaty was 
approximately twenty years ago. The Ministerial Declaration of the Second 
International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea states that 
 
[a]ccepting that in order to protect the North Sea from possibly damaging 
effects of the most dangerous substances, a precautionary approach is 
necessary which may require action to control inputs of such substances 
even before a causal link has been established by absolutely clear 
scientific evidence (Second International Conference on the Protection of 
the North Sea 1987, Paragraph 7; italics added). 
 
The second strategy to search for the origin of the precautionary principle is 
to identify cases in which the principle is thought to be present even if it has 
not been explicitly mentioned. Accordingly, the first instance of the 
precautionary principle in an official text may be found in the World Charter 
for Nature, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, as early as in 
1982. 
 
Activities that are likely to pose a significant risk to nature shall be 
preceded by an exhaustive examination; their proponents shall 
demonstrate that expected benefits outweigh potential damage to nature, 
and where potential adverse effects are not fully understood, the activities 
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should not proceed (World Charter for Nature 1982, Principle 11b; italics 
added). 
 
Principle 11b includes the basic constituents of the precautionary principle: a 
reference to an unacceptable threat of damage, to scientific uncertainty, and 
to precautionary measures in the form of inactions. 
 
Much more polemic cases have also been suggested (see e.g. Myers 2006, 4-
6). Among several others, Daniel Bodansky (1991) argues for the early use 
of the precautionary principle in law and policy (see also EEA 2001). In his 
view, although the principle is not explicitly mentioned in the environmental 
law of the United States (US),41 the precautionary principle has been the 
basis of much of it for several years. The “no discharge” requirement of the 
1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments is provided as an 
example of this. The act presumed that discharges of pollutants are harmful 
to the water quality in the first place even without any scientific predictions, 
and it included the so-called ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable) 
approach as the required response. Examples of the precautionary principle 
can also be found at international level. In the 1970s, a moratorium on 
commercial whaling “was justified on the basis of uncertainty about the 
impacts of continued whaling (…) rather than on the basis of scientific 
evidence (…)”. (Bodansky 1991, 5.) 
 
The further development of the precautionary principle in environmental law 
and policy is not reviewed here extensively. Several such analyses are 
available. The most comprehensive which I am aware of is that of 





Terminological issues present another source of confusion and disagreement 
in the discussion on the precautionary principle. For instance, while most 
authors speak about one definite principle (e.g. Rogers 2001), others use the 
indefinite plural form (e.g. Löfstedt et al. 2002). Second, several terms have 
been employed. In official documents, phrases such as “precautionary 
measures”,42 “precautionary principle”,43 “principle of precautionary 
                                                 
41 The US, however, endorses some international agreements that contain an explicit 
mention of the precautionary principle (e.g. UNCED 1992). 
 
42 First International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea 1984, Operative 
Paragraphs D.3 and H.7; Montreal Protocol 1987, Preamble, Paragraphs 6 and 8; Vienna 
Convention 1985, Preamble, Paragraph 5. 
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action”,44 “precautionary approach”45 can be found. An even more diverse 
set of phrases has been used in the commentary literature pertaining to the 
principle. Besides the afore-mentioned terms, the examples include 
“precaution” (Levidow et al. 2005), “precautionary thinking” (Trouwborst 
2002), “precautionary appraisal” (Klinke et al. 2003), “precautionary 
assessment” (Tickner 2003), “precautionary science” (Cranor 2003), and 
“precautionary principle/approach” (see e.g. VanderZwaag 2002, 167). 
 
The use of several terms opens up a logical space for (at least) three possible 
explanations. First, different phrases may refer to one construct (or entity). 
Second, they might allude to distinct constructs. Third, terms can be 
purposely employed in order to differentiate between constructs which 
overlap and have only subtle differences. Although the last explanation is 
certainly true of certain cases (especially those in the academic literature), 
the use of several terms can be neatly explained in the light of the first one. 
 
The following points make it understandable that some legal scholars (e.g. 
Hohmann 1994) use the plural form, i.e. precautionary principles, when 
they refer to the precautionary principle. First, there are several formulations 
of the principle in official documents (see e.g. Trouwborst 2002). Second, 
these formulations differ considerably from each other. Although differences 
in formulations of the principle are common in different regulatory contexts 
given the different situations in regard to risk imposition, knowledge about 
risks, and manageability of risks, formulations differ considerably also 
within a regulatory context. Let us briefly consider an example of this found 
in marine environmental protection. Whilst The Ministerial Declaration of 
the Second International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea 
states that precautions can be taken in the absence of absolutely clear 
scientific evidence, in the corresponding statement of the third conference, 
no evidence to prove the causal connection is required. 
 
[A] precautionary approach is necessary which may require action to 
control inputs of such substances even before a causal link has been 
established by absolutely clear scientific evidence (Second International 
Conference on the Protection of the North Sea 1987, Paragraph 7). 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
43 E.g. Treaty on European Union 1992, Article 130r(2); In the Third International 
Conference on the Protection of the North Sea, the term is mentioned three times: in 
Preamble, in Paragraph “Common Actions: Inputs of Nutrients” and in Paragraph 25. 
 
44 E.g. Parcom Recommendation 89/1 on the Principle of Precautionary Action (1989). 
 




[P]recautionary principle, that is to take action to avoid potentially 
damaging impacts of substances that are persistent, toxic and liable to 
bioaccumulate even when there is no scientific evidence to prove a causal 
link between emissions and effects (Third International Conference on the 
Protection of the North Sea 1990, Preamble). 
 
Daniel Bodansky (1991, 5) has phrased an obvious worry lying in the 
background: because different formulations of the precautionary principle 
state the trigger for taking precautions and the appropriate precautionary 
measures in radically differing ways, “it is difficult to speak of a single 
principle at all”. 
 
Nevertheless, instead of speaking about several principles, (at least, apart 
from judicial studies) it seems to be more fruitful to say that there is only 
one principle which is formulated (or understood) in various ways. The use 
of singular and plural may just indicate the fact that the precautionary 
principle is thought of at different levels of generality as Sandin notices. 
 
‘[T]he precautionary principle’ may refer to one or other principle of 
national or international law. Various precautionary principles, if I may 
use the plural, have been included in several international legal 
documents. Secondly, the phrase ‘the precautionary principle’ is used 
more broadly, referring to some principle that can (or should) be applied 
by decision-makers and policy-makers in general. (Sandin 2004b, 468.) 
 
In the academic literature, the third explanation seems to be true of some 
cases. Different terms have been employed to point out slight differences 
between theoretical positions. Joel Tickner (2003) has introduced 
precautionary assessment in which the principle has implications for the risk 
assessment phase. This goes against the typical view of the precautionary 
principle as merely a risk management tool (Section 1.4.). That one concept 
has, sometimes, been used in several meanings is also worth noticing. For 
instance, the term “precaution” has been employed to refer to the 
precautionary principle (e.g. Levidow et al. 2005), to the prescribed 
precautionary measures, and to the general idea of precaution (Sandin 
2004b). 
 
In official documents, the use of different terms seems not to imply a 
difference in content (at least, not in the sense of the second explanation). 
For instance, the terms “principle of precautionary action” and 
“precautionary principle” have been used synonymously. The most debated 
terminological issue is the possible disparity between the terms “principle” 
and “approach”. It is not straightforwardly clear as to whether there is a 
difference in meaning between the precautionary principle and the 
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precautionary approach (see e.g. Conco 2003, 642-643; Trouwborst 2002, 3-
5; VanderZwaag 2002, 166-167). It has been thought that the precautionary 
approach represents a less stringent version of the precautionary principle, 
and that it thus avoids theoretically implausible forms of absolutism such as 
total reversal of the burden of proof (II). According to Francisco Orrega 
Vicuña,  
 
[s]ince scientific uncertainty is normally the rule in fisheries management 
a straightforward application of the precautionary principle would have 
resulted in the impossibility of proceeding with any activity relating to 
marine fisheries. It is on these grounds that the concept of the 
“precautionary approach” surfaced with a view to provide a more flexible 
tool for the specific needs of fisheries management. (Orrega Vicuña 1999, 
157.) 
 
Whilst the precautionary principle is seen as practically unworkable, the 
precautionary approach is invoked as a well-founded regulatory tool in the 
context of fisheries management (for a further discussion on this view see 
Trouwborst 2002, 3-5). 
 
Another example can be found in the argumentation of Gregory Conco who 
relates the view that there is a real difference between these notions to the 
US government and to certain corporations and industry associations. These 
institutional actors insist on distinguishing between the precautionary 
principle and the precautionary approach. Following Conco’s description of 
this view, the precautionary principle implies total reversal of the burden of 
proof. Innovators or the proponents of an activity must prove the safety of 
their activities. Moreover, the fact that threats have different probabilities is 
not taken into consideration when acting upon the principle. The 
precautionary approach, in its turn, is in accordance with good guidelines for 
risk governance – risk assessment procedures and management decisions are 
standardised. 46 (Conco 2003, 642.) 
 
                                                 
46 Interestingly, it could be argued that the precautionary principle actually presents a 
more unequivocal guideline for specific action than does the precautionary approach. The 
former is a principle, and as a principle it can provide a justification for certain actions in 
concrete situations. In contrast, the precautionary approach might just be predicated to a 
regulatory approach that is considered precautionary in nature without implying any 
specific guidance for concrete situations. As noted earlier, it has been claimed that 
Directive 2001/18/EC, for instance, forms a precautionary regulatory framework 
(Schomberg 2006, 13). 
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Nonetheless, several authors hold the opposite view that the terms 
“precautionary principle” and “precautionary approach” can be used 
interchangeably (e.g. Mascher 1997, 70). According to Trouwborst, 
 
the basis in state practice for a distinction between the basic characteristics 
or legal consequences of application of the “approach” as opposed to those 
of the “principle” is extremely narrow (…) Rather, the terms are used 
synonymously in this respect. Consequently, a strict, hierarchical 
distinction after choice of terminology does not appear to find a solid 
foundation in international law. (Trouwborst 2002, 4.) 
 
The latter view is founded upon several facts. Certain official documents 
treat the terms as equivalents, i.e. they are used without any indication of a 
possible difference between them.47 Most academic authors have also used 
the notions synonymously (Trouwborst 2002, 5). Furthermore, in its 
Communication on the precautionary principle, the Commission of the 
European Communities (CEC 2000) does not make a difference between the 
precautionary principle and the precautionary approach. Lastly, the 
formulation of Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development (UNCED 1992) which is typically considered a paradigm 
example of the precautionary principle actually includes the term 
“precautionary approach” (for a more detailed discussion see Trouwborst 
2002, Chapter 3.). 
 
In this study, “precautionary principle” is employed as a uniting term for the 
various phrases found in official documents and in the relevant academic 
commentary literature. The disparities that the use of different terms 
sometimes implies are taken into consideration by means of speaking about 
different understandings of the principle (I-V). 
 
 
2.3. The Core of the Precautionary Principle 
 
One possible way to explicate a notion is to explore the meaning(s) of the 
concept(s) involved. This is the case when Sandin (2004b) analyses the 
concept “taking precautions” in order to establish necessary and sufficient 
conditions for its use. After distinguishing precaution from the related 
concepts (“prevention” and “pessimism”), Sandin introduces three criteria 
for an action to be considered precautionary in nature. As a result of the 
                                                 
47 See e.g. Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment 
from Land-Based Activities 1995, Annex B. no. 32, Paragraphs 23(i), 104(b)(i), 111(a), 
118(b)(i) and 124(b)(i) (excerpted from Trouwborst 2002, 4). 
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conceptual analysis, he proposes the following definition of precautionary 
action: 
 
An action a is precautionary with respect to something undesirable x, if 
and only if 
(1) a is performed with the intention of preventing x [the criterion of 
intentionality], 
(2) the agent does not believe it to be very probable that x will occur if a is 
not performed [the uncertainty criterion], and 
(3) the agent has externally good reasons (a) for believing that x might 
occur, (b) for believing that a will in fact at least contribute to the 
prevention of x, and (c) for not believing it to be certain or highly 
probable that x will occur if a is not performed [the reasonableness 
criterion] (Sandin 2004b, 467). 
 
Sandin’s contribution provides us with a more precise concept of 
precaution.48 Pessimism, for instance, has typically been linked to taking 
precautions. It is undoubtedly useful to show this connotation as erroneous. 
The relevance of the analysis for the discussion on the precautionary 
principle is not immediately clear, however. When the concept “precaution” 
is analysed in terms of our common sense intuitions and with the help of 
thought experiments, the result is an elaborated version of the general idea of 
precaution, not the right definition of the precautionary principle. 
Admittedly, Sandin (2004b, 468-470) does not argue that he has established 
the right definition of the principle, but that the criteria established can be 
employed to answer (or sidestep) two criticisms, i.e. arguments against the 
precautionary principle. 
 
Whether an analysis of the general concept of precaution can be employed in 
the definition of the precautionary principle is unclear. This is because 
decision-making rules/principles and principles of law, such as the 
precautionary principle, may have been given a precise definition which is 
strange to our common understanding of the terms involved in their name 
(or even unrelated to the ordinary meanings of the concepts). Although the 
names of these principles often reflect their content, this needs not always be 
the case. It is also worth noticing that most formulations of the precautionary 
principle do not state a criterion to differentiate between precautionary and 
non-precautionary acts. They merely specify a trigger condition and 
                                                 
48 Somebody might, nevertheless, question whether an agent who believes it to be very 
probable that x will occur if a is not performed, but who has externally good reason for 
not believing it to be certain or highly probable that x will occur if a is not performed, 
can also be regarded as acting in a precautionary way. The described situation may take 
place as an instance of self-deception. Accordingly, the need for the second necessary 
condition, the uncertainty criterion, might be problematised. 
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precautionary response. According to our everyday intuitions, some 
formulations (or definitions) may be considered more precautionary and 
others less so. Obviously, this does not make the former superior. 
 
In this section, I aim to explicate the precautionary principle (1) by 
illuminating three substantial propositions implied by it, (2) by identifying 
two paradigm examples of the principle, and (3) by abstracting its basic 
structure. Several approaches are used for explicatory purposes. To date, 
only a few serious philosophical attempts to clarify the core precautionary 
principle exist (Gardiner 2006; Manson 2002; Sandin 1999). Most authors 
who have written about the principle have just stated that there is no 
agreement on the exact meaning of the principle. 
 
Substantial Propositions. Even if the exact meaning (or right definition) of 
the precautionary principle is a matter of disagreement, a general core idea 
which leaves room for different interpretations can be identified.49 Ethically 
speaking, three substantive propositions are implied by the principle. 
 
First, serious environmental damage (such as loss of biodiversity) and health 
hazards (e.g. increased allergies) should be anticipated before they actually 
take place. This normative demand reflects a plea to narrow the scope of our 
ignorance and oversight. Concrete risk research and the active development 
of its methods can certainly increase our ability to identify and assess 
environmental and health threats, and also tell us about what we do not 
know. However, there may always remain possible outcomes that we do not 
know that we do not know about. In these cases, we are unaware of our lack 
of knowledge or omission from risk assessment. It would be highly 
impractical (i.e. costly and resource-demanding) and also partly impossible 
in principle to try to avoid these outcomes. Surprisingly, to date, this first 
substantial proposition has not received much direct attention in the 
academic literature of the principle. 
 
Second, the precautionary principle implies a norm to take pre-emptive 
actions in order to protect the environment and human health. This proactive 
                                                 
49 Obviously, the fact that there is a wide range of understandings of the precautionary 
principle does not rule out the possibility that all the understandings share a common 
core. A rough analogy might be drawn to what Walter B. Gallie meant by essentially 
contested concepts. A distinction can be made between a concept (e.g. justice) and 
different conceptions (definitions/theories of justice) of it. According to Gallie (1956, 
169), “there are concepts which are essentially contested, concepts the proper use of 




view may be contrasted with the reactive approach which states an 
obligation to remedy or compensate damage after it has come to fruition. (Of 
course, one possible position would also be not to care about these kinds of 
harm at all.) A similar account of the second core proposition implied by the 
principle can be found in Edward Soule who emphasises “a commitment to 
risk avoidance in terms of some environmental risks” (Soule 2002, 21). In 
his view, 
 
sometimes regulators should prohibit (or constrain) the commercialization 
of environmentally risky technology, even though the science that 
identifies the risk is uncertain and even though economic or other factors 
might recommend otherwise (ibid.). 
 
The third substantial proposition flowed from the precautionary principle 
concerns the right role of scientific knowledge in environmental and health 
decision-making. According to the principle, adequate scientific 
understanding of an identified threat is not a necessary condition for taking 
precautions. This feature distinguishes the principle (or the precautionary 
approach) from the earlier institutionalised risk governance approaches. 
Following Neil A. Manson, 
 
[t]his idea is supposed to run counter to standard decision-making 
procedures (e.g., cost-benefit analysis), in which possible but unproven 
causal connections do not count (Manson 2002, 264). 
 
Trouwborst distinguishes between “precautionary thinking” and the 
traditional model of environmental decision-making. 
 
The main feature of this [traditional] model, which is founded upon the 
assumption that science can to a sufficient extent foretell the outcome in 
terms of environmental impacts of any given human activity, is that action 
to protect the environment is solely justified when conclusive evidence 
shows that such an activity will cause (substantial) damage in the absence 
of preventative and abatement measures (Trouwborst 2002, 11; see also 
ibid. 11-12,18-19). 
 
With the help of critical analysis, the third proposition can be further 
specified. It will be argued in Papers I, II and IV that the proposition does 
not imply that any suspicions of risks, educated guesses or results of junk 
science are enough to trigger taking precautions, but that we “should act 
based on the best available science, albeit tentative, inconclusive, or in 
dispute” (Soule 2002, 21). 
 
Paradigm Examples. Despite the commonly agreed core idea, the 
precautionary principle has various forms which specify qualifications for 
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the substantial propositions. As noted before, a number of formulations can 
be found in official documents such as in international environmental 
treaties (see e.g. Trouwborst 2002), and several definitions have been 
proposed in the academic literature (Sandin 1999). Nevertheless, two 
particular formulations may be considered paradigm examples of the 
principle. The first one was adopted at the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. 
 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation (UNCED 1992, 
principle 15). 
 
This formulation is explicitly mentioned in most academic articles on the 
principle. It is typically presented as a basic example of the principle. (e.g. 
Manson 2002; Myers 2002, 211; VanderZwaag 2002, 167.) Furthermore, the 
formulation is included in several other official documents. The Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety (CPB 2000, 3), for instance, reaffirms this 
formulation. Lastly, when the precautionary principle is considered in the 
terms of strong interpretation and weak interpretation, this formulation is the 
most frequently given example of the latter (V). 
 
Another standard formulation was introduced at a conference organised by 
the SEHN in 1998. According to it, 
 
[w]hen an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the 
environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause 
and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically (Wingspread 
Statement on the Precautionary Principle 1998). 
 
The Wingspread Statement is mentioned in several academic articles on the 
precautionary principle as its basic example (e.g. Myers 2002, 211). 
According to Derek Turner and Lauren Hartzell (2004, 451), this 
formulation is “[t]he closest thing to a canonical version of the precautionary 
principle”. Environmentalists have typically endorsed the formulation (e.g. 
the SEHN). It is the most frequently provided example of the strong 
interpretation (V; see also Morris 2000; Soule 2002). 
 
Although these two formulations are considered the standard examples of 
the precautionary principle, that they differ is obvious. The former says only 
that uncertainty shall not be used as a reason not to take cost-effective 
precautionary measures, but the latter states an obligation to take precautions 
with no reference to cost-effectiveness. Furthermore, in the following 
paragraphs, the Wingspread Statement says that the burden of proof should 
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be shifted from the public (and governments and NGOs) to industry (and 
scientific community). Lastly, whilst in the Rio Declaration the term 
“precautionary approach” is employed, the Wingspread Statement mentions 
“precautionary principle”. 
 
Basic Structure. In addition to the clarification of the core propositions of 
the precautionary principle and identification of its paradigm examples, a 
basic structure as a decision-making principle can be abstracted. Some 
authors have proposed common elements or dimensions of the precautionary 
principle (Gardiner 2006; Manson 2002; Sandin 1999; see III, endnote 4). 
These elements, dimensions and logical core structure(s) of the 
precautionary principle are certainly laudable in their own right, and they 
provide us with a better grasp of the principle. Sandin’s structural schema 
(see 1999, 890-895) can be used to explicate, compare, and evaluate 
different formulations of the precautionary principle. However, the chosen 
terms, such as “dimension”, are not illuminative. As the precautionary 
principle is a decision-making principle, it would be relevant to speak about 
thresholds and prescribed actions, not about dimensions or elements.50 
 
The basic structure of the precautionary principle can be stated as follows: 
every formulation of the precautionary principle is a function of two 
variables, namely a trigger condition and precautionary response. When a 
situation fulfils the prerequisites described by (1) the trigger condition, the 
stated (2) precautionary response should be taken. 
 
The trigger is two-fold. It consists of (a) damage and (b) knowledge 
thresholds which determine the necessary and jointly sufficient 
preconditions for the application of precaution. The damage threshold 
concerns harmful or otherwise undesirable outcomes. More specifically, the 
relevant types of harm include (i) environmental damage, e.g. loss of 
biodiversity; (ii) human deaths and health hazards such as increased 
allergies; and (iii) harm to other sentient beings. Other kinds of risks such as 
                                                 
50 Another problem shared by Sandin’s and Manson’s structural schemata is that they do 
not seem to exhaust all the understandings of the precautionary principle even if they 
cover a number of its formulations found in official documents and in the academic 
literature. In concrete, the principle is sometimes viewed not only to affect the way in 
which the uncertain risks are governed (or managed) but also the way in which the threats 
are being identified and characterised in the first place (Section 1.4.). To be fair, Sandin 
softens the claim about the applicability of the structural schema in his later writings. 
According to him (2004b, 470), “there are, however, other versions of the precautionary 
principle which cannot be interpreted with the aid of the four dimensional if-clause”. 
Sandin himself considers the formulation of the precautionary principle in the Rio 
Declaration (UNCED 1992, Principle 15) an example of this. 
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economic ones − if taken into account at all (see Nollkaemper 1996) − are 
considered only indirectly. Although certain formulations of the 
precautionary principle include further qualifications for the relevant kinds 
of harm, the damage threshold is ultimately determined by the general 
chosen level of protection, or by the agreed level of acceptable risk. 
 
The damage threshold is specified variously in different definitions found in 
the academic literature (see Manson 2002, 267; Sandin 1999, 901) as well as 
in official formulations of the precautionary principle. Examples of the latter 
include formulations such as 
 
“possibly damaging effects of the most dangerous substances” (Second 
International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea 1987, 
Paragraph 7); 
 
“potential adverse effects” (World Charter for Nature 1982, Principle 
11b); 
 
“threats of serious or irreversible damage” (UNCED 1992, Principle 15); 
 
“threats to the environment or human health” (Wingspread Statement on 
the Precautionary Principle 1998). 
 
The second element of the trigger is the knowledge threshold which defines 
the required level of scientific understanding (of an identified threat) at 
which the prescribed precautionary response is well-founded. A narrow view 
based upon a decision-theoretic classification suggests that the principle can 
be applied when (i) the (objective) probability of a risk cannot be 
established, i.e. in the state of scientific uncertainty,51 or when (ii) the 
magnitude of a risk is uncertain or contested, that is, in the state of 
ambiguity. It has also been argued that the precautionary principle can be 
applied in the state of ignorance, viz. when neither the probability nor the 
magnitude of a threat can be assigned (for a discussion see e.g. Manson 
2002).52 A broader view which rests upon the level of scientific 
understanding (in a more general sense) states that taking precautions is 
well-founded when a threat is poorly understood in scientific terms, or when 
there are scientific discrepancies and disagreements on the nature of a risk. 
 
                                                 
51 It should be emphasised that, despite the fact that the precautionary principle is pre-
eminently a principle of law, the uncertainty which triggers its application is related to 
limitations on scientific understanding of a risk, not to legal uncertainty and/or proof. 
 
52 For a detailed discussion about different risk decision-making situations, see e.g. 
Stirling 2002, 77-82. 
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The knowledge threshold is also specified variously in the official 
formulations of the precautionary principle and in the different definitions 
found in the relevant academic literature (Manson 2002, 267; Sandin 1999, 
901). An interesting case example of the former comes from the Ministerial 
Declarations of the second and third international conferences on the 
protection of the North Sea: 
 
(…) which may require action to control inputs of such substances even 
before a causal link has been established by absolutely clear scientific 
evidence (Second International Conference on the Protection of the North 
Sea 1987, Paragraph 7; italics added); 
 
(…) to take action (…) even when there is no scientific evidence to prove 
a causal link between emissions and effects (Third International 
Conference on the Protection of the North Sea 1990, Preamble; italics 
added). 
 
Other examples found in the official formulations include, for instance, 
 
“effects are not fully understood” (World Charter for Nature 1982, 
Principle 11b); 
 
“lack of full scientific certainty” (UNCED 1992, Principle 15); 
 
“even if some cause-and-effect relationships are not fully established 
scientifically” (Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary Principle 
1998). 
 
In the abstract, the sources of limited scientific understanding (of a risk) can 
be divided into three classes. First, uncertainty and disagreements arise from 
incomplete analyses which are due to such factors as gaps in data or poor 
quality data. Second, analysis methods used may be invalid. This may take 
place, for example, in the form of faulty models, assumptions, and 
extrapolations from evidence. The relevant actual causal pathways do not 
necessarily correspond to those identified and tested. Third, our knowledge 
can also be limited by the high complexity and indeterminacy of some 
natural systems. Human factors (i.e. decisions in the future), for instance, 
can significantly reduce the accuracy of our predictions. 
 
The second structural part of the precautionary principle is the prescribed 
action. Precautionary response means taking pre-emptive measures. These 
may take the form of outright bans or phase-outs, moratoria, pre-market 
testing, labelling, and requests for extra scientific information before 
proceeding. Another kind of precautionary response would be the 
establishment and implementation of new precautionary risk assessment 
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methodologies (Section 1.4.). The latter reflects a heavy emphasis upon the 
first substantial proposition of the principle – the focus is not only on how to 
deal with the identified threats, but also on the methods to anticipate and 
assess threats in the first place.53 
 
Examples of the definition of the precautionary response in the official 
formulations of the precautionary principle include, 
 
“activities should not proceed” (World Charter for Nature 1982, Principle 
11b); 
 
“cost-effective measures” (UNCED 1992, Principle 15); 
 
“action to control inputs of such substances” (Second International 
Conference on the Protection of the North Sea 1987, Paragraph 7); 
 
“precautionary measures” (Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary 
Principle 1998). 
 
In addition to those mentioned aboved, Manson (2002, 267) provides us with 
the following examples of suggested precautionary measures (or 
e[nvironmental]-remedies in his terms): postpone the e-activity, encourage 
research alternatives to the e-activity, try to reduce uncertainty about the 
causal relationship between the e-activity and the e-effect, and search for 
ways to diminish the consequences of the e-effect (see also Sandin 1999, 
901). 
 
In sum, the basic structure of the precautionary principle can be stated as 
follows: 
 
(1) Trigger condition (environmental damage, 
health hazards, harm to other 
sentient beings) 
  (a) Damage threshold   (e.g. irreversibility, mortality) 
(b) Knowledge threshold (scientific uncertainty, ambi-
guity) 
(2) Precautionary response (e.g. bans, moratoria, 
labelling, precautionary risk 
assessment methodologies) 
 
This schema illuminates the precautionary principle, and it can be employed 
to evaluate different understandings/formulations of the principle (I-V). It 
                                                 
53 As an example of precautionary risk assessment methodologies, see Tickner 2003. For 
an analysis of the (narrow and broad) precautionary policies implemented within the EU, 
see Levidow et al. 2005. 
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should be noted that particular formulations of the principle determine 




2.4. Close Concepts, Principles and Approaches 
 
So far, I have tried to illuminate the precautionary principle and its history in 
various ways. In the present section, a different approach is brought into 
play. Instead of explicating what the precautionary principle is, the emphasis 
is on what it is not. Specifically, I will briefly discuss certain concepts, 
approaches and principles which have sometimes been considered 
synonymous or closely related to the principle.54 The aim is to show in 
which ways and why they differ from the precautionary principle. 
 
Close Concepts. The phrases “environmental risk”,55 “scientific uncertainty” 
and “precautionary measures” form the basis for different understandings of 
the precautionary principle. These phrases (or some equivalent notions) can 
be found in the various formulations of the principle. They may thus be 
referred to as its basic elements. Other concepts such as “irreversibility” 
(e.g. UNCED 1992, Principle 15), “reversal of the burden of proof” 
(Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary Principle 1998), “cost-
effectiveness” (e.g. UNCED 1992, Principle 15), “incertitude” (Stirling 
2004; Stirling 2002), “ambiguity” and “ignorance” are closely related to the 
principle. Some of them are employed as extra qualifications for the trigger 
condition or prescribed action in specific formulations of the precautionary 
principle. Others are introduced in the academic literature in order to clarify 
the principle (see e.g. ibid., 77-82). Nonetheless, it is important to notice that 
any of the above-mentioned notions alone does not cover the meaning of the 
precautionary principle. Analysis of these terms (such as “irreversibility”) 
can still be highly valuable. It might be used to systematise the application 
of the principle. For instance, it may be useful in the determination of the 
damage threshold. 
 
The concepts of “pessimism” and “prevention” have strong connotations 
with precaution. Even so, the notions are distinct. Sandin (2004b) claims that 
whilst precaution implies talk of actions, the notion “prevention” can also be 
employed in the case of events (of non-occurrence) without an intentional 
                                                 
54 This list is by no means meant to be exhaustive. For example, the ALARA (As Low As 
Reasonably Achievable) approach is not considered. 
 
55 Also “threat of environmental harm or health hazard”, “threat of damage”, and so on. 
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contribution. “[T]he small bush prevented me from falling off the cliff” 
(ibid., 463). Perhaps more importantly, we can take preventive actions even 
when the consequences (of inaction) are known beforehand. Precautions, in 
their turn, can only be taken under the condition of substantial uncertainty. 
Sandin’s argument for the difference between precaution and pessimism is 
simple but plausible. As pessimism is related to one’s attitudes and (the 
formation of and concentration on) certain kinds of beliefs, taking 
precautions is about what one does (ibid., 463-464). One can take 
precautions wholly regardless of her/his pessimism or optimism. In this 
regard, precaution seems to be closer to conservatism (or traditionalism) in 
policy. Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that the general idea of 
precaution per se is in itself distinct from the precautionary principle 
(Section 2.1.). 
 
Principles of Law. In the context of law, the precautionary principle is 
commonly regarded as an independent legal principle (see e.g. CEC 2000, 
11; also Hohmann 1994; Trouwborst 2002). Seemingly notwithstanding this, 
in his article “The Precautionary Principle in Science and Technology”, 
Andy Stirling (2002, 65) considers prevention, polluter pays, no regrets, 
clean production and biocentric ethics as the key subordinate principles (and 
approaches) to the precautionary principle.56 Even if this is a terminological 
blunder, it is worth explicating the way in which the precautionary principle 
differs from these and other similarly related principles and approaches such 
as sustainability. 
 
Admittedly, there are at least two arguments for Stirling’s claim. First, 
certain principles of environmental law such as the polluter pays principle57 
and the prevention principle may be thought to reflect a precautionary 
approach in a wide understanding of the latter term. Second, the terminology 
of (and demarcation between) these principles is still under discussion in the 
law literature. Nevertheless, this does not imply that these principles would 
be subordinate to the precautionary principle or implied by it, as Stirling 
seems to claim. I will now consider chapter and verse the relation between 
prevention, sustainability and biocentric ethics, and the precautionary 
principle. 
                                                 
56 Precisely, he employs the term “precautionary approaches”. 
 
57 The polluter pays principle determines in what scope the agent who places strain on 
nature is accountable for the effects on the environment which are consequences of the 
action(s). Roughly speaking, everyone whose actions have damaging effects to the 
environment or who imposes a risk of damage is responsible for the costs of anticipatory 




First, there is a difference between the precautionary principle and the 
prevention principle.58 Theoretically, when focusing on concepts, the 
distinction between prevention and precaution seems to be quite clear. The 
former implies higher certainty concerning the effects (or outcomes) which 
it is attempted to avoid than does the latter. Chronologically, precaution 
precedes prevention. As our knowledge about the effects advances, actions 
taken become less precautionary on the one hand and more preventive on the 
other. Although there may be cases where the distinction becomes blurred, 
clear examples (which leave no place for doubt) can be identified. If the 
effects are known, we can only take preventative actions. In the case of 
hunches or educated guesses without scientific evidence, taking precautions 
is in order. Accordingly, a typical argument for the difference between the 
prevention principle and the precautionary principle is that the former is to 
be applied when the probability of an unacceptable threat can be assigned in 
risk assessment. If the probability of the risk cannot be assigned, then the 
precautionary principle may be applied.59 
 
In practice, the distinction between prevention and precaution is far more 
complicated. First, in the legal realm, certain official formulations of the 
precautionary principle include the phrase “preventative measures” as part of 
the definition or clarification (see Trouwborst 2002, 40). For instance, 
“measures to prevent environmental degradation” is used in the Ministerial 
Declaration on Sustainable Development in the ECE Region (1990, 
Paragraph 7). Second, the principles are not always distinguished from each 
other in environmental policy. The precautionary principle has been referred 
to with the term “preventive, precautionary approach” and with other similar 
notions (Trouwborst 2002, 38-39). At other times, the principles are, 
however, sharply distinguished. For example, both principles are explicitly 
mentioned in the Treaty on European Union (1992, Article 130r [2]) as basic 
principles upon which all Union’s environmental policy should be based. 
 
Several legal scholars consider the precautionary principle to be rooted in 
the prevention principle. The former is seen as an enlargement of the latter. 
                                                 
58 Several phrases have been used to refer to the principle: “preven(ta)tive principle”, 
“principle of preven(ta)tive action” and “preven(ta)tive approach”. Trouwborst (2002, 
35-36) briefly considers the relation between the prevention principle and the principle of 
avoidance of transboundary harm. (Sometimes, the latter is called the prevention 
principle.) 
 
59 The precautionary principle cannot be applied to any imagined threats without 
evidence, but only to the ones that fulfil the trigger condition. 
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(Trouwborst 2002, 39.) This interpretation can be based upon the fact that 
several official formulations of the precautionary principle include the 
passage “even if scientific understanding of the threat is inadequate” or some 
equivalent (e.g. Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary Principle 1998; 
see also UNCED 1992, Principle 15). The impression that pre-emptive 
actions should be taken in the case of risks whose probability can be 
assigned and even when risks are uncertain (i.e. in the case of risks whose 
probability and/or magnitude cannot be assigned) is a tempting one. 
Availability of full scientific understanding no longer draws the line on 
whether or not to take pre-emptive actions (Section 2.3.). “Action must be 
taken not because of, but despite the uncertainty” (Trouwborst 2002, 40). In 
this light, it seems that precaution would actually be subordinate to (or 
continuation of) prevention, not vice versa.60 
 
Second, the precautionary principle needs to be distinguished from (the 
principle of) sustainable development and the principle of sustainable use.61 
This is the case even if the precautionary principle is typically viewed as part 
of a change in approach towards the environment in environmental policy 
which is closely related to the general idea of sustainability (Section 1.2.). 
However, it may be a fact that implementing a strategy based upon 
sustainability requires the invocation of the precautionary principle as its 
part (see e.g. Deblonde & Jardin 2005; Karlsson 2003). 
 
In order to achieve sustainable development, policies must be based on the 
precautionary principle. Environmental measures must anticipate, prevent 
and attack the causes of environmental degradation. Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent 
                                                 
60 Nonetheless, it is not implausible that the evolution of the precautionary principle 
might entail consequences for the prevention principle. The latter may lose (at least 
partly) its status as an independent (law) principle. Official documents which refer to the 
precautionary principle but not to the prevention principle may be thought to imply the 
latter. The Rio Declaration (UNCED 1992), for instance, only mentions the 
precautionary principle (literally, the precautionary approach). It does not make sense to 
claim that because of the precautionary principle there is a commitment to take pre-
emptive actions in the case of uncertain threats which count as serious, but not to take 
preventive measures as the knowledge of the risks in question advances/becomes 
complete (see also Trouwborst 2002, 44). 
 
61 “Sustainable development” has been defined and interpreted in several ways, e.g. in 
regard to its possible normativeness. Its most well-known formulation can be found in the 
report, entitled Our Common Future (1987), of the World Commission on Environment 
and Development. This report is often called the Bruntland Report. 
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environmental degradation. (Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable 
Development in the ECE Region 1990, Paragraph 7.) 
 
Third, the precautionary principle does not imply a commitment to 
biocentric ethics, i.e. to a bundle of ethical theories which give a moral 
status (e.g. rights) to non-human species and which consider life (in all its 
forms) as having at least some intrinsic value. Not only human beings and 
their interests are valuable, but also ecosystems, other mammals, birds, 
fishes, insects, plants, and so on. Regardless of the plausibility of this 
standpoint, the precautionary principle per se “does not take a particular 
position as to why the environment should be valued” (Parker 1998, 638). 
As argued earlier, the principle implies two norms with regard to the 
environment. First, environmental damage should be anticipated before it 
actually takes place. Second, pre-emptive actions should be taken in order to 
protect the environment even if scientific understanding of the risk in 
question is inadequate. (Section 2.3.) Neither of these substantial 
propositions presupposes a specific justificatory reason for the preservation 
of the environment. Nature is somehow valuable; thus, we should take active 
steps to protect it. Although the precautionary principle does not 
straightforwardly imply biocentric, anthropocentric or any other specific 
ethical theory, it is obviously in accordance with several biocentric 
justifications as well as with the anthropocentric claim that precautions 
should be taken to protect human interests (II; III). “Perhaps we do not have 
to kill the last fish and poison the last river before realising that we cannot 
eat money”. 
 
Decision Theory. Albeit the precautionary principle has not received much 
attention from decision-theorists, some of decision theory’s developments 
come close to its basic idea. First, striking similarities can be found between 
the precautionary principle and the maximin decision rule.62 The latter was 
proposed in the mid-forties as the rational decision-making rule (or 
principle) for decisions under uncertainty. Maximin guides us to choose the 
decision option that maximises the minimum outcome. After identifying and 
assessing possible outcomes for various actions, we should choose the action 
whose worst outcome is the least bad/damaging. Second, irrevocability as a 
qualification of the damage threshold of the precautionary principle seems to 
have earlier counterparts. Irreversible consequences in terms of restricting 
tomorrow’s set of opportunities (or decision possibilities) with today’s 
choices have been a subject of close scrutiny and debate in decision theoretic 
literature since the early seventies (see e.g. Immordino 2003). 
                                                 





Given the above, it is not unexpected that decision theory has been 
employed to formalise the principle. Sven Ove Hansson (1997, 305), for 
instance, has argued that “[t]he maximin rule can be used as a formal version 
of the precautionary principle”.63 This is a good point as the similarities 
(such as the emphasis on avoiding the worst possible outcomes) between 
these two conduct-guiding norms are obvious. However, there are also clear 
differences. The maximin rule is applicable to a wide range of decision 
problems, whilst the precautionary principle is typically taken to concern 
environmental risk decision-making under uncertainty. The level of 
generality is different. In particular, the precautionary principle does not 
merely concern eschewing the worst possible outcome, but it prescribes a 
pre-emptive response to all identified threats that fulfil the trigger condition. 
The precautionary principle also qualifies the avoidable states of affairs as 
certain environmental and health outcomes. Moreover, the precautionary 
response prescribed by the precautionary principle includes a variety of 
different measures in addition to the possibility of inaction, whereas 
maximin merely tells us which (externally identified and assessed) decision 
option we should (not) choose. 
 
Even if we sidestep the obvious differences in content and applicability and 
accept the possibility that the maximin rule could be used to formalise the 
precautionary principle, one may ask whether there are substantial benefits 
in doing so. In the end, several debated questions pertaining to the 
precautionary principle also apply to the maximin rule. First, the knowledge 
threshold of the precautionary principle is hard to define accurately. It can 
always be purposely disputed (to further interests which are unrelated to the 
environmental protection) because strict scientific standards for the relevant 
evidence are not required. Science cannot be used to settle the matter. 
Scientific proof is not a necessary condition for applying precautionary 
measures, but nor are logical possibilities sufficient either (see Manson 
2002; Räikkä 2004).64 In this regard, the maximin rule per se seems not to 
offer any further advice because it does not specify how (im)plausible 
threats should be taken into account. Second, both the precautionary 
                                                 
63 For other attempts to formalise or clarify the precautionary principle with the help of 
decision theory, see e.g. Chisholm & Clarke 1993. An interesting discussion can also be 
found in the argumentation of Stephen Gardiner (2006) who tries to narrow the scope of 
plausible interpretations of the precautionary principle with the help of the Rawlsian 
maximin principle. 
 




principle and the maximin decision rule may be applied in random and 
unjustified ways. Implementing invoked precautions is sometimes argued to 
culminate in a greater overall risk (II; see e.g. Goklany 2001). As Hansson 
(1997, 306) admits, similarly local applications of maximin “may add up to 
global incautiousness”. Third, not only is the precautionary principle a 
matter of ongoing disagreements and substantial criticism, but it has also 
been argued that the maximin decision rule and its modifications “lead to 
serious paradoxes because they suggest wholly unacceptable practical 
decisions” (Harsanyi 1975, 594). 
 
Not surprisingly, Hansson ends up modifying the maximin rule in order to 
formalise the precautionary principle. Given the clear theoretical and 
practical value of finding answers to the debated issues outlined above, he 
takes upon a real challenge when trying to solve the problems of the 





Philosophically speaking, if one wants to comprehend an entity, there are 
three basic questions to answer. How this entity came into being? What kind 
of an entity it is?65 How it differs from other entities? In this chapter, these 
questions have been considered with respect to the precautionary principle. 
First, the origin of the principle was traced to three classes of sources. 
Second, terminological confusion was clarified. Third, the core principle 
was illuminated. Fourth, the relation of the precautionary principle to certain 
close concepts, principles and approaches was analysed. 
 
On the basis of the analysis above, the core idea of the precautionary 
principle can be stated as follows: unacceptable environmental and health 
risks should be anticipated (foreseen), and they ought to be prevented 
(forestalled) before the damage comes to fruition even if scientific 
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The aim of the preceding chapter was to provide a preliminary but firm 
conceptual grip of the precautionary principle. In particular, the principle 
was explicated by (1) clarifying its origin and development, (2) elucidating 
terminological issues, (3) identifying its core, and (4) distinguishing it from 
other principles, approaches and concepts. In conclusion, although certain 
authors refer to the precautionary principle in the plural form, it is more 
fruitful to speak about one principle that is formulated – and can be 
understood/interpreted – in various ways. The core idea of the precautionary 
principle is that unacceptable environmental and health risks should be 
anticipated (foreseen), and they ought to be prevented (forestalled) before 
the damage comes to fruition even if scientific understanding of the risks is 
inadequate (see also I-V). 
 
In Paper I, the background and history of the precautionary principle as well 
as its connection to modern biotechnology are first briefly discussed, and the 
distinction between the weak interpretation and strong interpretation of the 
principle is clarified. Second, a three-part structure shared by every 
formulation of the precautionary principle is identified. These three 
structural parts are the knowledge condition, damage condition and 
precautionary action. Third, it is claimed that the implementation of the 
precautionary principle currently has to deal with many open questions and 
problems. These also include new challenges for democratic decision-
making procedures. Fourth, it is argued that two particular criticisms – the 
argument from absolutism66 and the argument from the unscientific nature 
of the precautionary principle – do not lead to the abandonment of the 
principle. 
 
The origin and development of the precautionary principle is explicated in 
more detail in Paper IV (see also Section 2.1.). In particular, it is shown that 
the attempts to trace back the origin of the precautionary principle can be 
subsumed under three classes. These include (1) the general idea of 
precaution, (2) specific (non-judicial) codes of conduct and arguments from 
precaution, and (3) official documents. The connection between the 
precautionary principle and modern agri-biotechnology is considered at 
length in Paper IV. The distinction between the strong and weak 
interpretations is put under critical scrutiny in Paper V. The basic structure 
                                                 
66 Sandin (2004b) uses the phrase “argument from absolutism”. 
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of the precautionary principle is elaborated upon and slightly revised in 
Papers III and IV (see also Section 2.3.). It is then summarised as follows: 
 
(1) Trigger condition 
(a) Damage threshold 
(b) Knowledge threshold 
(2) Precautionary response 
 
In Paper II, it is argued that three criticisms which have been presented in 
academic discourses, political arenas, and also in public discussions with the 
aim of rejecting the principle altogether do not result in the abandonment of 
the precautionary principle on the whole, but only of its particular 
implausible interpretations. The criticisms are labelled as the argument from 
vagueness, the argument from incoherence, and the argument from adverse 
effects. The argument from vagueness says that the precautionary principle 
is ill-defined, and thus too vacuous to offer any useful guidance for decision-
making; consequently, it should be abandoned. The argument from 
incoherence refers to the following kind of inference: incoherent principles 
should not be used as the basis for societal risk decision-making; the 
precautionary principle is incoherent; thus, it should be rejected. The 
argument from adverse effects is the claim that implementation of the 
precautionary principle would lead to serious and commonly unwanted 
consequences, and thus that the principle should be abandoned as a 
policymaking tool. Each of the three arguments is explicated and its more 
detailed versions are assessed. Lastly, a brief review of the reasons for 
taking precautionary actions is provided. The rationale for taking 
precautions includes the fact that human action can lead – and has already 
contributed – to serious and irreversible environmental damage. Ecosystems’ 
sensitivity and intra-/interdependencies are increasingly acknowledged. 
Traditional environmental risk governance has disregarded real risks with 
highly detrimental consequences. The conclusion drawn from these factors 
is that the burden of proof remains with those who reject the principle 
altogether. 
 
Paper III introduces a framework which both illuminates different normative 
commitments and choices related to the implementation of the precautionary 
principle and enables ethical evaluation of specific understandings of the 
principle. Normative underpinnings present in the implementation of the 
precautionary principle are as follows: 
 
(1) Extrinsic normative choices 
(i) Introduction of the precautionary principle to a 
regulatory context 
(ii) Determination of the general level of protection 
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(iii) Normative deliberation related to the interpretation 
and implementation of the principle 
(2) Intrinsic normative commitments 
(a) General 
(i) Severe environmental damage and health hazards 
should be anticipated before they actually take place 
(ii) Pre-emptive actions should be taken in order to protect 
the environment and human health 
(iii) Adequate scientific understanding of an identified 
threat is not a necessary condition for taking precautions 
(b) Specific 
(i) Extra qualifications for the damage threshold found in a 
particular formulation (or definition) of the principle 
(ii) Extra qualifications for the knowledge threshold found 
in a particular formulation (or definition) of the principle 
(iii) Extra qualifications for the prescribed precautionary 
response found in a particular formulation (or definition) 
of the principle 
 
In Paper IV, the precautionary principle is considered in relation to the 
current dispute over the well-founded risk governance of modern agri-
biotechnology. Two facts call for the precautionary principle in agri-biotech 
risk governance. First, there are uncertainties concerning health hazards and 
long-term environmental impacts. Second, several alleged risks are matters 
of ongoing scientific debate. The risks of modern agri-biotechnology are 
briefly discussed, after which the meaning of the precautionary principle is 
illuminated by explicating the substantial propositions that it implies, by 
identifying its paradigm examples, and by abstracting its basic structure. 
Two opposing views on the right role of the precautionary principle in agri-
biotech risk governance are subjected to critical analysis. According to the 
first view, the precautionary principle should be implemented in the risk 
governance of modern agri-biotechnology. The second view says that the 
principle should not be implemented in the agri-biotech context. Neither 
view is found to be satisfactory. Finally, a middle stance is suggested. 
 
The main argument of Paper V is that the current usage of the traditional 
distinction between the weak form and strong form of the precautionary 
principle – upon which the ongoing debate has been centred – is ambiguous, 
inexhaustive and semantically misleading. First, the traditional distinction 
has been employed or defined in several ways (i.e. the distinction is made on 
the basis of different criteria). Second, the distinction does not cover all the 
interpretations of the precautionary principle found in national and 
international risk governance and in the related academic literature. Third, 
not all the strong interpretations are actually especially strong, or the weak 
ones especially weak. It seems superficial to speak of the strength or 
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weakness of the weak and strong interpretations in general. Furthermore, the 
way in which the strength/weakness is spoken of within the two 
interpretations derived from the use of particular decisive criteria does not 
make sense. The analysis also discloses elementary understandings of the 
principle, and thus provides a sound basis for subsequent scrutiny. In 
particular, the precautionary principle (or any particular formulation of it) 
needs to be considered at least in regard to the following dimensions: (1) the 
principle as a concrete risk decision-making tool vs. a guiding principle in 
the design of a regulatory framework, (2) the status of the principle in 
scientific risk analysis, (3) placement of the burden of proof, (4) definition 
of the knowledge threshold (i.e. how much evidence for a threat is required 
[not] to invoke precautionary measures), (5) the status of cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA), and (6) the nature and normative status of precautionary 
measures. 
 
These five papers present the main thesis of this study. In particular, it is 
argued that the debate needs to be shifted from the question of whether the 
precautionary principle or its weak or strong interpretation are well-
grounded in general to the questions about the theoretical plausibility and 
ethical and socio-political justifiability of specific understandings of the 
principle. Notwithstanding this, much of the current discussion has still 
concerned the former question(s). Even so, the issue is too generally (i.e. 
poorly) formulated, and thus it is impossible to give a satisfactory answer. 
Instead of focusing on the oversimplified “yes” and “no” stances or on the 
distinction between the weak interpretation and strong interpretation, further 
constructive discussion can only concern elaboration of the middle 
standpoints. 
 
The real picture of the precautionary principle is more complex than that 
found (i.e. presumed) in much of the current academic, political and public 
debate surrounding it. The wide range of different understandings of the 
principle cannot be captured by simple classifications such as the traditional 
distinction between its strong interpretation and weak interpretation. The 
specific interpretations of the precautionary principle may only be correctly 
evaluated one by one and in relation to the relevant regulatory context(s). As 
a result of the analysis, certain presumptions and interpretations of the 
precautionary principle were found to be sound, while others are 
theoretically flawed or present serious practical problems. In other words, 
the range of plausible readings of the precautionary principle was narrowed 
down. 
 
Paper VI highlights shortcomings in public consultation practices on the 
deliberate release and placing on the market of GMOs in the EU. It is argued 
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that current GMO consultation practices do not meet the aims and objectives 
on which their introduction is typically justified. Specifically, they do not 
necessarily serve democracy, increase consensus, enable better decisions to 
be made, or establish trust. It is concluded that there is a clear need for the 
active development of GMO consultation practices and for critical 
discussion on the ethical foundation of public engagement. 
 
Paper VII discusses the question of whether acting against moral 
prohibitions is worse than acting against some other moral norms in the light 
of three classical distinctions in ethics. The prohibition thesis, that is, the 
claim that on a moral scale prohibitions are weightier than other norms is 
related to the distinction between negative and positive rights, that between 
acts and omissions, and that between duties and supererogatory acts. 
Although the distinctions as such do not imply normative consequences, 
they have frequently been employed by moral critics. The strict 
interpretation of the prohibition thesis is concluded to be false. 
 
Finally, the analysis has disclosed conceptual and ethical presumptions and 
elementary understandings of the precautionary principle, critically assessed 
current practices invoked in the name of the precautionary principle and 
public consultation, and sought to build bridges between precaution, 
engagement and ethics. Hence, it is intended to provide a solid basis upon 
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